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 The paper surveys the literature and publicly available information on market 
power monitoring in electricity wholesale markets. After briefly reviewing definitions, 
strategies and methods of mitigating market power we examine the various methods of 
detecting market power that have been employed by academics and market 
monitors/regulators. These techniques include structural and behavioural indices and 
analysis as well as various simulation approaches.  The applications of these tools range 
from spot market mitigation and congestion management through to long-term market 
design assessment and merger decisions. Various market-power monitoring units already 
track market behaviour and produce indices. Our survey shows that these units collect a 
large amount of data from various market participants and we identify the crucial role of 
the transmission system operators with their access to dispatch and system information.  
Easily accessible and comprehensive data supports effective market power monitoring 
and facilitates market design evaluation. The discretion required for effective market 
monitoring is facilitated by institutional independence. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
The experience of countries that have liberalized their electricity markets has shown that 
the assumption that markets will naturally produce a competitive result is not always 
justified.  Part of the problem derives from the difficulty of defining the relevant market. 
The number of different generation companies that directly compete with each other 
depends on the strength of the transmission system and the capacity of interconnectors 
between regions and countries. The present European reality is that although many 
countries have internally densely meshed networks with mostly adequate capacity, 
interconnections between countries are often inadequate and frequently congested. 
Congestion fragments markets into smaller zones behind the congested interconnections, 
and within these zones, the relevant market may be very concentrated. Even within 
countries, a transmission system that was efficient for a centrally dispatched vertically 
integrated monopoly may still give rise to potential internal transmission constraints that 
can be exploited by companies with generation capacity located in some parts of the 
country. In addition, electricity is a non-storable product with low demand 
responsiveness, and so markets are distinguished by time – electricity at 0800 is a 
different product that electricity at 0900 on the same day. Congestion varies over time 
and space, changing the size of the relevant market and the problem of market power 
from place to place and moment to moment. All these special features of the nature of 
electricity have led to concern over the existence of market power.  
 
Transmission system operators (TSOs) are concerned with the secure and efficient 
operation of the electricity system.  Market power adversely affects this objective.  First, 
it can induce generation companies to withhold output and lead to short-term supply 
shortages. Second, it results in distortions of price signals, resulting in inefficient dispatch 
and investment decisions. It may be argued that market monitoring is expensive, possibly 
costing some tens of millions of euros per year, and at best leads to a redistribution of 
rents between companies and consumers. This argument is readily countered. In a 300 
TWh/year market such as Britain, the wholesale market may have a value of 10 billion 
euros per year. Inefficiencies of 0.1 of 1% of this amount to 10 million euros per year, 
and the extra production costs of inefficient dispatch will almost surely be considerably 
greater than this. For example, changing the merit order to cause a switch in a marginal 
plant of 1000 MW running 5000 hours per year that costs 2 euros/MWh more, amounts to 
an extra cost of 10 million euros/year. Such inefficiencies increase system costs and may 
induce regulators to impose further controls that risk further inefficiencies. Distorted price 
signals also make it more difficult for the TSO to assess the system conditions and 
therefore increases operational risks. TSOs should therefore be interested in contributing 
to measures that limit market power to avoid these negative effects, and are also well 
placed to provide information to aid the monitoring of market power. 
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The possible consequences of such market power include not only wealth transfers 
between customers and operators (which are politically important) but also impacts on 
operational and investment efficiency.  The issue is of particular importance to policy 
makers and legislators as the effects of market power can substantially erode the benefits 
of deregulating an electricity market. The California experience showed how rapidly 
problems can arise in situations of unexpected scarcity (with inadequate contract 
coverage), and how easy it is for poorly informed policy makers and politicians to make 
hasty and costly decisions. Very high prices in wholesale markets can induce a flurry of 
investment and contracting (in California’s case, effectively by the State) that can 
precipitate market collapse and the financial distress of power companies. If future 
investment decisions are then left to the willingness of banks to finance an industry that 
they poorly understand and with which they have had recent bad lending experiences, the 
quality of investment decisions and future security of supply may be prejudiced. Thus the 
process of monitoring markets as a means of detecting and remedying market power has 
taken on an increased level of importance in liberalized markets as well as countries 
planning to take the liberalization route.   
 
In the Californian case market surveillance concentrated on the local market, and failed to 
monitor developments in the interconnected Pacific Northwest. An awareness of the 
interdependence of related markets is therefore important for timely and effective market 
surveillance, and may well suggest improvements elsewhere. Thus price spikes in the 
Netherlands electricity spot markets were linked to an inefficient market design for gas 
balancing. In California, the market design of the NOx market contributed to high 
electricity prices. Without detailed information on the hourly behavior of individual 
plants such assessments would not have been possible. 
 
However, detecting and proving the existence of market power in electricity markets is 
not an easy task.  Economists and regulators have yet to develop a generally accepted, 
standardized set of market power monitoring procedures.  Rather there exists a range of 
tools, techniques and measures - some drawn from standard industrial organization 
theory, some especially developed for electricity markets - which are employed to 
varying degrees by the different market monitors and regulators throughout the world.  
 
The development of electricity market monitoring has varied across nations.  In most 
cases of market deregulation, the focus of the various participants has been on developing 
the operational systems, particularly the hardware, software and communications systems, 
needed to support the newly deregulated energy markets.  Market monitoring systems 
have often been neglected in the initial specification and have thus subsequently evolved 
in a home-grown and somewhat piecemeal fashion.  In some countries the neglect of 
market monitoring was intentional, such as in New Zealand where the problems of market 
power were expected to be dealt with by the market and general competition law.  Even 
in the United States, where the federal regulator FERC is required to ensure that 
wholesale prices occur at “just and reasonable” rates, until the late 1990s market power 
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concerns were mainly limited to mergers and the issuing of licences for trading at market 
rates.  However, dissatisfaction with the level of competitiveness in these markets has led 
to changes in the role of market power monitoring and control in both countries.  New 
Zealand recently set up a regulator, the Electricity Commission, whose roles will include 
market monitoring. In the US, various market monitoring units have been implemented in 
different regions, and FERC has used Order 2000 and the Standard Market Design 
proposal (2002) to specify market monitoring as one of the eight essential functions that a 
Regional Transmission Operator (RTO) must provide.  
 
The US experience is of particular relevance to transmission system operators, since 
market power monitoring in that country is normally carried out by the Independent 
System Operator, some of which have, or hope to, become Regional Transmission 
Operators.  The system operator naturally has access to much of the data that is required 
for effective monitoring, including a complete description of the transmission system, and 
continuous records of generator outputs, demands, and power flows.  These system 
operators are also independent of any market participant, which should ensure their 
objectivity in dealing with sensitive matters.  A system operator that is still integrated 
with generation or retailing, however, is unlikely to be a suitable host for an independent 
market monitor.  Later in the paper, we discuss independent system operators’ incentives 
for undertaking market monitoring, and show that it can be to their advantage even if 
there is no formal requirement to do so.   
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the methods developed by economists for detecting 
market power, and to look at the actual practice of market power monitoring in a number 
of countries.  Most of the coverage of this paper is on countries outside the European 
Union.  This is mainly due to the availability of information and the more advanced 
development of market monitoring units outside Europe. While some EU regulators have 
established market surveillance units and provide information on their web-sites,2 it is 
unusual for these web-sites to provide the depth of information to be found on the 
examples we discuss, and for that reason we have concentrated our attention on examples 
of international best practice. Along with this analysis, we will look at the requirements 
for effective monitoring and analysis of market power and the role played by various 
organizations in the process of collecting and analysing information. We give particular 
attention to what is required of the transmission system operators in the market 
monitoring process. 
 
The focus of this paper is on the detection of market power.  This includes the detection 
of the potential for market power as well as the actual exercise of market power. We will 
not, however, be examining the broader role of market monitoring which includes 
identifying and analysing the market rules that may have efficiency effects outside of 
those related to market power. There will also be little emphasis on the techniques that are 
                                                 
2  See for example, http://www.dte.nl/en/msc.asp
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employed to mitigate market power. However, to the extent that mitigation techniques are 
linked to particular market detection methods such mitigation techniques will be 
mentioned.   
 
The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 introduces some of the key concepts of 
market power, including the various definitions of market power, strategies of exercising 
market power, categories of market power detection and methods of market power 
mitigation. Section 3 reviews the theory and empirical work on detecting potential and 
actual exercise of market power. These include structural indices, behavioural indices, 
simulation models and transmission analysis.  Section 4 looks at the practice of market 
monitoring including the organizational forms of market monitors and the data and 
indices examined by market monitors. In light of this discussion of the theory and 
practice of market monitoring, section 5 discusses the requirements for effective 
monitoring and analysis of market power with particularly emphasis on the role of TSOs. 
Section 6 concludes the paper.  The appendix is available in the online version of this 
paper at the Cambridge-MIT Institute (CMI) Electricity Project website3 and reviews a 
number of markets where there is available information of the data and indices monitored 
in practice.  
 
2.  Market Power  
 
2.1 Defining Market Power 
 
Market power is typically defined as the ability to profitably alter prices away from 
competitive levels (Stoft 2002, p.318). The European Union defines Significant Market 
Power (SMP, specifically, in communications markets) as equivalent to the concept of 
dominance. An undertaking is defined as having SMP if, alone or jointly with others, it 
has “the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, 
customers and ultimately consumers” (OJ, 2002). There are, however, a number of 
variants of this definition.   
 
Most definitions include the requirement that the exercise of market power be profitable.  
If this was not the case, for example, a company with a single large base-load plant that 
shuts off its plant and that has no other market positions could be defined as exercising 
substantial market power (in terms of ability to affect the market price) even though this 
strategy would be completely unprofitable for the company. In order to fully determine 
whether an action is profitable, however, one would need to know the complete portfolio 
position of the company. This is a very onerous requirement. As such, most market power 
indices based on company conduct typically rely on the assumption of rationality: if we 
assume companies are profit-maximizing, then we can assume that observed company 
conduct which alters prices is profitable for the company.   
                                                 
3 http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/electricity/ 
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The above example also raises the question of whether a company’s behaviour that 
appears to profitably exploit market power is necessarily intentional.  Plants do break 
down and it would seem unfair to penalize a company just because that breakdown 
happened to be profitable for the company.  As we will see later, statistical measures are 
sometimes used to examine this issue. For example, if the breakdowns of a plant are 
correlated with periods when such breakdowns significantly raise prices, then we may 
infer that the conduct is intentional and not accidental.  This statistical information can be 
used as a trigger for further investigation or, depending on the burden of proof required 
for market power cases, used as prima facie evidence for the existence of market power 
abuse.  
 
Some definitions of market power include the provision that the ability to alter prices 
away from the competitive level be maintained for a ‘significant period of time’. In the 
view of the U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), for 
example, this period is measured in years (e.g. one or two years). However, experience 
with electricity markets has shown that huge transfers of wealth can occur in the period of 
months rather than years. A short-lived but dramatic price increase can injure consumers 
and competition as much as a longer-lived but more modest price increase. As such, 
market power definitions for electricity markets, such as with FERC’s definition in the 
Standard Market Design (SMD), do not include a specific time limitation.  In the UK, the 
main regulatory agency Ofgem (the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets) unsuccessfully 
tried to introduce a so-called Market Abuse Condition in the licences of generators which 
included the recognition of both the magnitude and duration of market power.  The 
condition stated that a generator had the ability to exercise market power if it could bring 
a wholesale market price change of: 
 
 5% or more for a duration of more than 30 days in a one-year period; 
 15% over ten days in a one-year period, or 
 45% over 160 half-hours (approximately 1% of the year) in a one year period. 
 
These periods did not have to be continuous periods. Note that the effect of this test is to 
define market power as the ability to increase wholesale market prices in such a way as to 
increase annual wholesale market revenue by rather less than ½ of 1 percent. This might 
seem an unreasonably stringent test of potential market power, but the idea of relating the 
potential price increase to annual revenue is clearly sensible.4
 
There are a number of implications and distinctions that arise from the above definitions 
of market power.  First, high prices, while often recognized as a symptom of market 
power, do not prove that market power exists. High prices can be consistent with a well-
performing, competitive market where supply is scarce.  Similarly, high profits for an 
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individual generator may also be due to a number of factors other than exercising market 
power.  It should also be noted that market power may be exercised so as to lower prices 
below the competitive level. This may occur with a dominant generator which is 
operating a predatory pricing strategy or be the result of monopsony power of consumers.  
Low wholesale prices may also be indicative of other structural problems with 
insufficiently unbundled companies securing their overall profit objectives by increasing 
profits in protected market segments and deterring entry into potentially competitive 
segments. 
 
A distinction should also be made with respect to the industry structure to which the 
concept of market power is being applied. Horizontal market power concerns company 
behaviour in a single market activity (e.g. generation) and is often exercised via control of 
a significant market share.  Vertical market power concerns companies involved in two or 
more related activities, such as electricity generation and transmission, where dominance 
in one area is used to raise prices and increase profits in the other activities.  Concerns 
related to vertical market power in the electricity sector are commonly understood and 
will not be discussed here.  The mechanisms for addressing them, such as requirements 
for independent operation of the transmission system and non-discriminatory access to it 
are now becoming more widely accepted. 
 
There is also an important relationship between the various electricity energy markets 
including the spot, day-ahead and forward markets. It is often assumed that as long as the 
spot market is competitive, this will discipline the other forward markets (Stoft, 2002). 
Also, as first noted by Green (1992), in a simple two-period model, generators that have 
contracted all their energy in the forward market have no incentive to distort the spot 
price, and will therefore bid competitively. That is, the forward market is a powerful 
means of mitigating market power in the spot market. Joskow and Kahn (2002) confirm 
this theory by their observation that “the one supplier for which we do not find any 
significant evidence of withholding had apparently contracted most of the output of its 
capacity forward.”  
 
However, as McDiarmid (2002) points out, spot market mitigation deals only with the 
component of forward prices that depends upon spot price expectations. It does not 
mitigate the part of forward prices that depends upon buyers’ risk aversion.  If market 
monitors do not directly mitigate market power in forward markets, sellers in regions with 
limited competition may be able to extract market power rents from buyers’ willingness 
to pay for price certainty. In other words, they will obtain in the forward market rents that 
they cannot obtain in the spot market.  Thus, to the extent that load serving entities cannot 
afford to wait around for the spot market to ensure long-term supply stability, short-term 
mitigation will not necessarily put adequate competitive pressure on sellers with market 
power with regard to the forward market (McDiarmid, 2002). Given that the forward 
                                                                                                                                                  
4  Two companies successfully appealed to the British Competition Commission against being 
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price risk premium is related to spot price volatility, Robinson and Baniak (2002) 
theoretically demonstrated that generators with market power have an incentive to create 
volatility in the spot market.  Examining the period in the UK market when the two major 
generators were subject to price caps and no longer subject to regulated vesting contracts 
(1994-1996), they found evidence to support this hypothesis.  
 
Another common distinction of relevance here is the separation of system-wide market 
power from local market power.  The former refers to market power occurring at the 
broad market level, typically due to the existence of dominant generators and/or tight 
supply conditions. Local market power arises when transmission constraints create 
isolated geographic markets in which the broader market players can only minimally 
participate.  Particularly around large population centers and in geographically remote 
areas, there are often only a small number of generation units able to meet a local energy 
or reserve capacity requirement.  In such cases the incumbent generators face little 
competition and have the potential to exercise market power.  As well as having the 
obvious consequence of extracting substantial profits from the market in these regions, a 
secondary, somewhat less obvious consequence lies in the impact of this local market 
power on the broader market.  Knowing that there is a chance that a portion of a 
generator’s output must be taken, it will bid that output less aggressively into the market 
than it otherwise would. Other companies, knowing that their competitors are likely to 
compete less aggressively, will also find it profitable to bid less aggressively. This creates 
a process of negative feedback that can lead to higher prices throughout the entire region. 
 
The transmission constraints that give rise to local market power may occur naturally or 
by the manipulation of transmission facilities or generator dispatch patterns.  It is 
important to note that the problem exists regardless of the methods used to price 
transmission congestion, whether by physical transmission contracts with separate energy 
markets or with integrated energy and transmission markets (nodal pricing, zonal pricing, 
market coupling) with financial transmission contracts. However, designs that deviate 
from nodal pricing with financial transmission contracts ignore or simplify physical 
reality and thereby create additional opportunity for the exercise of market power. Section 
3.4 will examine some of these issues. 
 
Finally, there is an important distinction between the potential for market power and the 
actual exercise of market power.  To the extent that prevention is often better than cure, 
we will see that interest in detecting potential market power is deemed by most market 
monitors as just as important a tool as detecting the actual exercise of market power.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
required to accept the Market Abuse License Condition, which was then abandoned by Ofgem. 
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2.2 Strategies of Exercising Market Power 
 
How market power is exercised depends on the exact structure of the market, and in 
particular the price-setting mechanism. However, the primary methods of exercising 
market power are:  
 
(1) Physical or quantity withholding, which involves deliberately reducing the output 
that is bid into the market even though such output could still be sold at prices 
above marginal cost.  Withholding can be done through not bidding, de-rating, or 
declaring unit outages. 
(2) Financial or economic withholding, which involves bidding in prices higher than 
the competitive bid for the particular unit. 
(3) Transmission related strategies, which involves creating or aggravating 
transmission congestion in order to raise prices in a particular zone or node.  
Insufficiently unbundled generators can achieve this through outages of 
transmission, understating transmission ratings/capacity, and dispatch of 
generation deviating from marginal cost 
 
From an analytical perspective these strategies (especially the first two) are often 
equivalent.  For example, a shift in the supply curve could be a leftward shift due to 
reduced output or an upward shift due to increased price depending on which company 
has withdrawn output or raised their bid price (Stoft, 2002). In either case, the unifying 
idea is that these strategies would not be profitable in a competitive market - raising the 
bid price or physically withholding output would just result in a smaller market share 
without receiving any additional revenue on the rest of the company’s portfolio. 
However, in some cases, the strategies have differing effects on the resulting merit order. 
 
 
2.3 Detecting Market Power 
 
Detecting market power is never an easy task and doing so in electricity markets is no 
exception. However, there are features of electricity markets that assist in the detection of 
market power that are not present in most other markets. For example, in electricity pools 
and most spot-markets generators bid their willingness to provide output for their entire 
range of market prices (whereas in other markets we typically only observe the market 
clearing price and quantity data).  One useful consequence is that it is possible to 
construct actual residual demand curves for individual market participants. The elasticity 
of this residual demand curve provides a direct measure of potential market power, as 
discussed below. Another feature of most electricity markets is that technological data 
such as generation heat rates and capacity are often available to monitors because many 
generation units were formerly state-owned or under a cost-regulation regime or are 
technologically standard units for which there is publicly available cost data.  Thus 
forming estimates of costs is perhaps more precise than in other industries. Another useful 
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feature of the electricity industry is that the overwhelming contribution to short-run 
variable costs is the cost of fuel, for which prices are usually readily available. Indeed, 
several price reporting services such as Platts provide estimates of the spark and dark 
spread – the margin of spot or forward electricity prices over the spot or forward cost of 
fuel used (either gas or coal respectively) in plant of standardised thermal efficiency. 
 
In classifying the various methods of detecting market power a useful distinction is 
between techniques that are applied ex ante - looking for the potential for market power - 
and those that are applied ex-post - usually looking for the actual exercise of market 
power.  A second useful distinction is between those techniques that are applied over 
longer time horizons, often in the context of merger analysis or market design evaluation, 
and those techniques that are applied close to the real time market, often in the context of 
immediately mitigating market conduct.  Table 1 gives some examples of the market 
power detection techniques, categorize under these two distinctions, which will be 
discussed in this paper. 
 
 
Table 1 - Categories of Market Power Detection Techniques5
 Ex-Ante Ex-Post 
Long-Term Analysis 
- Structural indices, e.g. 
Market share, HHI, 
residual supply index 
- Simulation models of 
strategic behaviour 
- Competitive benchmark 
analysis based on 
historical costs 
- Comparison of market 
bids with profit 
maximizing bids 
Short-Term Analysis 
- Bid screens comparing 
bids to references bids 
- Some use of structural 
indices such as pivotal 
supplier indicator and 
congestion indicators 
- Forced outage analysis 
and audits 
- Residual demand 
analysis  
 
Other classifications of market power detection techniques are also possible.  Some 
techniques are applied to the market as a whole and thus do not identify particular 
companies as causing or likely to cause market power problems (e.g. the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index). Other market power measures are applied at the company level in the 
market and identify individuals companies (e.g. the pivotal supply index). 
 
Most of the techniques can be applied at both the system-wide market level and the local 
market level.  However some indices are exclusively concerned with transmission market 
conditions and local market power issues. 
 
2.4 Mitigating Market Power 
                                                 
5 This table is inspired by a similar table in Helman (2004) 
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It is not the aim of this paper to examine or evaluate the various proposed remedies for 
reducing market power.  However, it is useful to have some idea of the types of market 
mitigation methods that may be implemented by a market monitoring or regulatory 
authority in order to determine what market detection techniques are more likely to be 
useful for their purpose.  For example, if it is deemed that mitigation should be applied 
ex-ante (e.g. requiring suppliers with potential market power to bid at cost) then an ex-
ante detection technique such as the pivotal supplier index is more likely to be useful than 
an ex-post econometric study of price-cost margins.  
 
Before examining some of the market power mitigation methods, it may be useful to be 
reminded why the electricity industry requires special remedial treatment as compared to 
other industries.  In most countries there is a general competition or anti-trust authority 
that covers the role of investigating and remedying possible abuses of market power.  As 
such, most industries do not require a special market monitor or regulator.  However, as 
most economists argue, the nature of electricity production and consumption make it 
particularly susceptible to market power.  The two most important factors are: 
 
 Electricity cannot be stored cheaply (except in hydro facilities), which, along with 
binding, short-run capacity constraints, makes the supply response relatively 
inelastic; 
 Demand price-responsiveness of electricity customers is limited and therefore 
very inelastic. Typically only large industry customers are exposed to real time 
prices. Steps to expand real-time pricing to larger consumer groups are often 
discussed by economists. However, given the comparatively low cost of electric 
input to most production and consumption decisions it is unclear how much real-
time metering would alter the situation.6 
 
The combination of inelastic supply and demand facilitates the exercise of market power 
when total demand moves closer to total supply capacity during peak demand periods.  
 
The electricity industry also has characteristics that tend to assist in tacit collusion among 
its participants. The European Commission uses the term ‘collective dominance’ to 
describe those markets that are susceptible to tacit co-ordination and lists characteristics 
of these markets.  These include concentration, transparency, maturity, frequent market 
interaction with a homogenous product produced by companies with similar costs and 
                                                 
6 See Patrick and Wolak (2001) for an analysis of demand elasticity for medium and large 
industrial companies in the UK during the period 1991 through 1995.  They found that price 
elasticities varied considerably across industries as did the pattern of within-day substitution in 
electricity consumption. During high price periods, they found that, despite small elasticities, 
significant load reduction occurs for these participants.  See Lafferty et al. (2001) for further 
discussion of demand responsiveness in electricity markets. 
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market shares, facing an inelastic demand, and with barriers to entry.7 To varying 
degrees, electricity markets display most of these characteristics, which supports the case 
for the special treatment of the electricity industry. 
 
Market mitigation methods can be loosely collected into three main categories: 
 
 Structural solutions, 
 Regulatory solutions, and  
 Market rules solutions. 
 
The classical structural solution to the problem of market power is to mandate or 
encourage the divestiture of the dominant generator or generators. One of the earliest 
examples of this was in the UK, where the conventional generation units of the formerly 
state-owned monopoly were split into two new companies, which in turn were later 
encouraged to further divest their assets.  In addition, encouraging new market 
participants by reducing or removing barriers to entry is also recommended as a useful 
means of encouraging a competitive electricity market.  Barriers may include licence 
conditions, generation site permits, and non-discriminatory access to the transmission 
network.  Expansion of the transmission system is also another means of decreasing 
concentration of generation by expanding the geographic market over which suppliers are 
competing. On the demand side, various means of increasing price responsiveness of 
electricity customers is also seen as a promising way of reducing market power.   
 
Regulatory forms of market mitigation include the imposition of system wide constraints 
such as market-price caps.  Many countries include such caps as a ‘safety-net’ measure.  
Another regulatory tool is to require dominant generators to sell a certain amount of their 
capacity under long-term contracts at a pre-negotiated or regulated rate.  Where 
governments have privatised generation companies they have frequently provided them 
with so-called ‘vesting’ contracts as a transitional tool in the development of competitive 
electricity markets.8  In other cases, governments may provide private generation 
companies with Competition Transition Contracts to allow them to recover stranded costs 
incurred under a previous cost-based regulatory regime (as in Spain and California). 
Similarly, where divestiture was found to be institutionally or politically difficult, there 
have been cases where the right to use electricity generation units has been auctioned off 
rather than ownership of the assets themselves (e.g. Alberta, or in Virtual Power Plant 
                                                 
7 For a theoretical discussion of the factors affecting the sustainability of tacit collusion in the 
context of supergame theory, see Tirole (2002). 
 
8  Vesting the company takes place when it changes its form to a limited liability company, hence 
the term vesting contracts, put in place at that date. These may be intended to provide 
predictability to the revenue stream to facilitate a convincing privatisation prospectus, but have 
the indirect effect of reducing the incentive to manipulate the spot market. Problems of market 
power may thus be concealed until the contracts fall due for replacement, at which point they re-
emerge, as in Britain in 1993 (Newbery, 1995). 
 12
auctions in e.g. France and The Netherlands).  In general, the encouragement of forward 
contracting is regarded as an important means of reducing market power (Allaz & Vila, 
1992). 
 
The third type of market mitigation methods are those market rules or behavioural 
regulations aimed at the actual operations or decisions of the generators in electricity 
markets.  The most important of these include caps on unit-specific bidding.  These are 
often regarded as the most heavy-handed form of regulation and most liable to have 
unintended undesirable side effects.  They also often require specific company related 
information that may be difficult to acquire.  
 
Most economists would argue that the regulatory and market rules mitigation solutions 
should be used as transitional devices on the road to fully competitive markets or only 
under rare market conditions, rather than a foundation upon which to operate the market. 
But even in the short term there is a need to balance the cost of mitigating market power 
against the costs of the market power itself.  Most economists would agree that it is far 
more costly to eliminate all market power than to allow some market power to exist.  For 
example, there are efficiency benefits of providing flexibility to supply bids but there are 
potential market power consequences as well.  Unfortunately there is little empirical work 
examining these trade-offs.  Similarly, the use of price caps has created an enormous 
debate regarding their effect on revenue sufficiency for peaking plants (e.g. Stoft, 2003).  
If price caps lead to plants only covering their marginal costs, there will not be enough 
revenue to cover the fixed costs of the plant.  For this reason, perfect competition is not 
necessarily the appropriate standard to be aiming at. Economists generally refer to 
‘workable competition’ as a competitive standard with an acceptable level of market 
power.  However, economists are not always clear as to what this acceptable level of 
market power should be. 
 
It should also be mentioned that the electricity sector varies from most other sectors in 
that a variety of different technologies are applied to produce electricity. If market power 
distorts prices, then both operational and investment decisions between these technologies 
can be seriously distorted. For example, some economists argue that the exercise of 
market power during times of capacity scarcity might provide a way to finance fixed 
costs. However, it might over-reward units available during this period and thereby 
discriminate against intermittent (renewable) energy generation. 
 
As with market detection techniques, the applications of market mitigation methods can 
be classified on an ex-ante/ex-post and short term/long term basis.   Table 2 gives an 
example of the applications of market mitigation as sorted by this classification. 
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Table 2 -  Applications of Market Power Mitigation Systems 
 Ex-Ante Ex-Post 
Long-Term 
-Mergers rulings 
-Assessing applications for 
market-based rates (in US) 
- Determining potential 
must-run generators 
-Litigation cases (e.g. 
California refund case) 
- Changing market design 
Short-Term 
- Spot market bid 
mitigation 
- Must-run activation & 
other system operator 
contracting 
-Short term price re-
calculations 
- Penalties for withholding 
 
 
3. Indices and Models of Detecting Market Power 
An ideal index of market power is one that provides in a simple number a measure of the 
ability to exercise market power. The test of its suitability is its ability to predict the 
exercise of market power, or its correlation with the excess of the market price above a 
reference benchmark competitive level. On this criterion, some measures that work well 
for other markets perform poorly in electricity markets, and more sophisticated measures 
are therefore required. 
 
3.1  Structural Indices 
  
A natural starting point in discussing measures of market power is the structural indices 
of traditional industrial organization theory.  Some of the earliest work in market power 
in electricity markets (e.g. Schmalensee and Golub, 1984) was based on analyzing market 
share and the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index.   Criticisms of these measures, in 
particularly the appropriateness of these static measures in a dynamic market such as 
electricity, has led to the development of other indices which take into account demand 
conditions and not just the supply side (e.g. the pivotal supply index).  The aim of this 
section is to briefly review the features and applications of these indices. 
 
3.1.1  Market Share 
 
Concentration indices are usually simple scalar metrics that measure the supplier 
concentration of a market.  The motivation behind these indices is that the more 
concentrated a market, the more likely is the ability of its participants to exercise market 
power.  The two most commonly used concentration indices are market share and 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 
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The market share concentration ratio is the percentage of market share of the largest n 
companies in the industry. The number of companies, n, is often 4, but for the purposes of 
discussion here we will assume that the index is used for a single company. Thus, if 
company A is producing 30 MW in a market of 100 MW, company A is said to have a 
market share of 30%.  Shapiro (1989) provides a theoretical justification for the use of 
this index as a measure of potential of market power by showing that a company’s profit 
is maximized in a Cournot equilibrium when the price-cost margin (a measure of the 
exercise of market power, discussed later) is proportional to the market share of the 
company and inversely proportional to the market-wide price elasticity of demand. 
 
In order to calculate this index, some preliminary definitions need to be made which are 
not uncontroversial.  Firstly, the relevant product needs to be identified. In electricity 
markets the choices can include energy production, energy plus reserves, short-term 
capacity or long-term capacity. As mentioned above, electricity in different half-hours 
may not be readily substitutable, so a time dimension (e.g. weekday winter peak-hours) 
may also be needed.  As it is not always clear what is the most appropriate product, many 
studies include a number of different market share indices based on these products.  The 
second preliminary definition concerns the geographic boundaries of the market: who 
should be considered competitors of a company?  A number of methods have been 
employed. Two of the traditional approaches have been the classical ‘law of one price’ 
test and the ‘small but significant non-transitory increase in price’ (SSNIP) test.  
 
The SSNIP test asks:  If all the generators in a particular geographical location combined 
into a single company, could a price rise, say 5%, in that region be sustainable? The 
classical “law of one price” test defines a market as the geographic area within which the 
same thing is sold for the same price at the same time, allowance being made for 
transportation costs (in this case, transmission losses but not congestion rents which arise 
where markets are separated). While this is easy to implement in electricity markets due 
to the vast amounts of price data available, its use for antitrust purposes has been met 
with criticism (Werden and Froeb,1993; Scheffman and Spiller, 1987; Haddock et al, 
2003). 
  
In the US in the 1990s, FERC adopted a market size definition called the ‘hub and spoke’ 
test.  The market size was simply the total capacity controlled by the targeted applicant 
plus that of all utilities directly interconnected with that applicant ignoring any 
transmission constraints might exist.  This definition was used by FERC originally to 
assess the impacts of electric utility mergers on market concentration and later employed 
in the assessment of market-based rates.  
 
Having established a product and market size definition and calculated the market share, a 
benchmark for the resulting market share needs to be defined: what is a significant market 
share such that authorities should be concerned about the possibility of market power?  In 
the US, FERC identified 20% as the benchmark for finding lack of market power, 
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although there were a number of cases where it approved market-based rates even where 
this threshold is exceeded.9 European case law in normal markets defines significant 
market power (SMP) as equivalent to dominance, and notes that market shares are not 
conclusive, but if no company has a share greater than 25%, there is a presumption of a 
lack of SMP, and a finding of SMP normally requires a market share of greater than 40%, 
with a share above 50% presumptive of SMP. Clearly this is unlikely to be a useful test 
for electricity markets, which have very different characteristics from normal markets. 
Indeed, in a recent merger inquiry, the Dutch Competition Commission (NMa) imposed 
remedies to offset concerns of market power when the merged company would have had 
less than 30% of the Dutch electricity market. 
 
Market share indices are a popular tool and have been with academics and, as we shall 
see in section 4, market monitors.  Once the product and market boundaries have been 
determined, the index is easy to calculate and can be used in long term studies as well as 
close-to-real-time screening.  However, most users of this index are aware that it has 
serious limitations which we will examine after discussing another popular concentration 
index. 
 
3.1.2 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
 
One of the criticisms of the market share index is that the ability of a company with a 
20% market share to exercise market power may be different when that company is the 
largest player in a largely deconcentrated market, versus being the second or third largest 
player in a highly concentrated market.  An attempt to address this systems aspect of 
market power is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 
 
The HHI is calculated by taking the sum of the squares of the respective market 
participant’s market shares: 
 
HHI = S12+S22+…+Sn2  
 
Where Si is the percentage market share of company i. For example where there are 10 
equal sized companies in the market, the HHI would be equal to 10*102=1000. As the 
HHI is composed of company level market shares, the same issues of product and market 
size definitions obviously have to be addressed here as well. 
 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Vantus Energy Corp., 73 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,099, at 61,315-16 (1995) (26% installed 
generation market share acceptable), clarified, 74 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,258 (1996); Southern Co. 
Services, Inc., 72 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,324, at 62,405-06 (1995) (26% installed capacity in one market, 
with shares in excess of 20% in 13 of 15 relevant markets, acceptable), order on reh’g, 74 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,141 (1996). In the context of the PJM independent system operator, the 
Commission has also accepted market-based rates where market shares exceeded 25%. Atlantic 
City Electric Co., 86 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,248 (1999). (Source: Bogorad and Penn, 2001) 
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One justification for use of the HHI is that under certain conditions, most critically 
constant marginal costs and no capacity constraints, the HHI divided by the elasticity of 
demand is equal to the Cournot equilibrium Lerner index, which is another indicator of 
market power discussed below (Tirole, 2002).  
 
In evaluating the significance of a particular HHI, the results can be broadly characterized 
into three regions: 
 
 unconcentrated (HHI below 1000), 
 moderately concentrated (HHI between 1000 and 1800), and  
 highly concentrated (HHI above 1800).  
 
In an early study, Schmalensee and Golub (1984) calculated values of the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index (HHI) for electricity markets throughout the United States for 170 
generation markets serving nearly three-quarters of the U.S. population. They found that, 
depending on the cost and demand assumptions used, 35 percent to 60 percent of all 
generation markets had HHI values above 1800.  A more recent study by Cardell, Hitt 
and Hogan (1997) suggests that electricity markets are still highly concentrated. Using 
1994 data and a narrower definition of the geographic scope of electricity markets, they 
calculate HHI values for 112 regions based on State boundaries and North American 
Electric Reliability Council (NERC) subregions. Approximately 90 percent of the 
markets examined in this study had HHI values above 2500. 
 
A major criticism of market share and HHI analysis for electricity markets is that even 
where the most dominant net seller has a relatively small market share (say less than 
10%) they may still be able to exercise market power.  This is seen as a consequence of 
being a static measure and examining only the supply side of the market. Electricity 
market conditions change hour by hour due to changing demands levels, generation 
outages, transmission failures, etc.  Most significantly, during periods when the system 
demand is close to capacity, a supply can become ‘pivotal’ and exercise market power 
even with a relatively small market share.  Sheffrin (2001) points out that under certain 
definitions of the relevant market, no single supplier in California had a 20% market 
share during the California crises10, yet many would argue that the market was not 
workably competitive. William and Rosen (1999) found that a daily HHI based on actual 
power delivered had no ability to predict actual market power as measured by the price-
cost margin index (discussed below). 
  
In the U.S, the use of market share using the hub-and-spoke methods was dropped in 
November 2001 when it was replaced by the Supply Margin Assessment criteria (see 
below). However, in April 2004 FERC announced that is would again be using market 
share (but with a new method for determining the market size) as one of two “indicative 
                                                 
10 Similarly, Blumsack and Lave (1999) calculate a HHI of 664. 
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screens” (along with the Pivotal Supplier Indicator discussed below) to determine 
whether utilities should be permitted to sell electricity at market-based rates (FERC 
2004).  Their market share analysis considers the percentage of the total uncommitted 
generating supply in a market that is owned or controlled by the applicant during each of 
the four seasons of the year. If the applicant has more than a 20 percent market share of 
the total uncommitted capacity in the market in any season, it is presumed to have market 
power. 
 
3.1.3   Pivotal Supplier Indicator 
 
The pivotal supplier indicator is an attempt to incorporate demand conditions, in addition 
to supply conditions, in a measure of potential market power.  This indicator examines 
whether a given generator is necessary (or ‘pivotal’) in serving demand.  In particular, it 
asks whether the capacity of a generator is larger than the surplus supply (the difference 
between total supply and demand) in the wholesale market.  Bushnell, et. al. (1999) 
defined the Pivotal Supplier Index (PSI) as a binary indicator for a supplier at a point in 
time which is set equal to one if the supplier is pivotal, and zero if the supplier is not 
pivotal.  The PSI from each hour over a period of time (e.g. one year) can then aggregated 
to determine the percentage of time for which a company achieves pivotal status.  For 
example, Bushnell et al (1999), in an ex-ante study of the Wisconsin/Upper Michigan 
(WUMS) region, found that the largest supplier would have pivotal supplier status in 55% 
of the hours in a year.11
 
The Supply Margin Assessment (SMA) is the name of the pivotal supplier indicator 
adopted by FERC in 2001 as a market power screen to replace the 20% market share 
screen.12 However, the SMA has subsequently been criticized on a number of accounts 
(McBeidle 2002, Vasssipolous 2003):  
 
 The measure is highly restrictive and is triggered by a single hour being pivotal; 
 The measure does not account for net buying or selling positions in the market 
 It only applies to peak hours and thus may miss other opportunities to exercise 
market power.  For example, many US markets have found price spikes in non-
peak periods due to maintenance outages and unexpected weather patterns.  
Furthermore, the relevant market is defined by transmission constraints that can be 
sensitive to the precise combination of generation and load on a system at a 
particular time (McBeidle, 2002) 
                                                 
11 For other examples of the use of the PSI see Morris (2003) and Patton (2002). The latter uses 
the PSI to examine location market power. 
 
12 The SMA methodology was articulated in AEP Power Marketing, Inc., et al.6 97 FERC 
¶61,219 (2001). 
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 By only looking at whether a single supplier is pivotal during peak hours, the 
SMA overlooks the potential for coordinated interaction among generators, 
ranging from explicit collusion to conscious parallelism. Kirsch (2002) and 
Blumsack et al (2002) argued that the SMA or pivotal supply indicator should be 
supported by an HHI metric applied specifically to groups of suppliers who, 
together, are pivotal. 
 The definition of market supply surplus ignores the necessity of maintaining an 
operating reserve. 
 
Many of these criticisms, however, are not of the concept of the pivotal supplier index but 
of its implementation. 
 
3.1.4 Residual Supply Index 
 
The Residual Supply Index (RSI) is similar to the PSI but is measured on a continuous 
scale rather than a binary scale.  As such the index addresses the criticism of the PSI in 
that it may be possible for a company to exercise market power when it is nearly, but (as 
the PSI shows) it is not actually pivotal.  The RSI was developed by the California 
Independent System Operator (CAISO).13   
 
The residual supply index for a company i measures the percent of supply capacity 
remaining in the market after subtracting company i’s capacity of supply. 
   
RSIi = (Total Capacity-Company i’s Relevant Capacity)/Total Demand 
 
where:  
Total Capacity is the total regional supply capacity plus total net imports, 
Company i’s Relevant Capacity is company’s i’s capacity minus company i’s 
contract obligations, and  
Total Demand is metered load plus purchased ancillary services. 
 
When RSI is greater than 100 percent, the suppliers other than company i have enough 
capacity to meet the demand of the market, and company i should have little influence on 
the market clearing price. On the other hand if residual supply is less than 100 percent of 
demand, company i is needed to meet demand, and is, therefore a pivotal player in the 
market. As well as calculating an individual company’s RSI, an RSI can be calculated for 
the market and a whole. It is usually defined as the lowest company RSI among all the 
companies in the market and will correspond to the largest supplier in the market.   
 
Empirically, the RSI has been used successfully in predicting actual market power as 
measured by the price-cost mark-up (discussed in section 3.2).  CAISO analysis of actual 
                                                 
13 See Sheffrin (2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c) 
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hourly market data found a significant relationship between hourly RSI and hourly price-
cost markup in the California market. The relationship indicates that on average an RSI of 
about 120% will result in a market price outcome close to the competitive market bench-
mark. (Sheffrin, 2001). CAISO has also evaluated the market power mitigation benefit of 
the expansion of a transmission path by analyzing the market benefits of more imports 
into a region which can increase RSI and reduce prices.  The price-cost-RSI analysis can 
also be used to test the level of reserve margin necessary to yield competitive market 
results. (Sheffrin 2001) 
 
Based on this analysis, Sheffrin (2002a) argues for the usefulness of market screening 
rules of the type: 
 
 RSI must not be less than, say, 110% for more more than 5% of the hours in a 
year (about 438 hours); or 
 RSI must be more than, say, 110% for 95% of the hours in a year 
 
The advantage of using the RSI over PSI is that there is flexibility is setting thresholds 
compared with the PSI, which is implicitly set at 100%.  Thus using a higher threshold 
(e.g 110%) may account for possible collusion.  Furthermore, RSI thresholds can be 
adjusted on the base of experience. 
 
3.1.5 Residual Demand Analysis 
 
Residual demand analysis is a more sophisticated measure of the incentive of a company 
to exercise market power that is derived from examining the residual demand curve faced 
by a company (Baker & Bresnahan, 1992).  The residual demand curve is calculated by 
subtracting from the total demand curve all the offer curves bid into the market by other 
participants.  Of course, in real time the company does not know exactly the residual 
demand curve it faces.  However, it can be constructed ex-post.14 As mentioned earlier, 
one of the advantages of electricity markets is that such data for constructing residual 
demand curves actually exists. However, whether such data is archived and available to 
the market monitor or regulator is another issue (see section 5). 
 
In a competitive market, a company will face a highly elastic residual demand curve and 
will have no ability to raise prices above the competitive level via any amount of 
withholding. At the other extreme, if a company is pivotal (as defined above), then it 
faces a highly inelastic residual demand curve and will suffer little loss in sales by 
charging a high price.  In the intermediate cases, a company may not be strictly pivotal (in 
                                                 
14 An interesting feature of the ex-ante uncertainty of the residual demand curve that a company 
faces, is that it in turn affects the elasticity of its own bid curve.  The more uncertainty a company 
faces, the range of possible equilibrium supply curves narrows away from both the high price 
supply curve (full Cournot pricing) and the competitive pricing supply curve. This feature is an 
important part of Klemperer and Meyer’s (1989) supply function equilibrium analysis. 
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terms of total market capacity) but may still face a range of prices for which it may be 
able to exercise some market power depending of the degrees of residual demand 
elasticity.  
 
Baker & Bresnahan (1992) and Wolak (2000) have demonstrated a theoretical 
equivalence between the inverse of the residual demand elasticity and the Lerner Index – 
a popular measure of market power discussed in the next section. The results of residual 
demand analysis are usually expressed in this manner.   
 
In electricity markets, the main empirical work employing residual demand analysis has 
been conducted by Frank Wolak (2000, 2003).  For example, Wolak (2003) measured the 
incentives of the five largest electricity suppliers in California to exercise power in the 
state’s wholesale market during 1998-2000. Using actual bids submitted to the California 
Independent System Operator’s (CAISO) real time energy market he computed the hourly 
price elasticity of the ex-post residual demand curve faced by each supplier evaluated at 
the market clearing price for that hour. Using the average hourly value of the inverse of 
the company-level residual demand elasticity over the period Jun 1 to September 30 of 
each year as a summary measure of the extent of unilateral market power possessed by 
each supplier, Wolak found that this measure increased substantially in 2000 relative to 
the corresponding company-level values in 1998 and 1999. He uses these results to argue 
that the enormous increase in market power documented in other studies (e.g. Borenstein 
et al. (2002)) was due to increases in unilateral market power and thus there is no need to 
use collusion as an explanation. 
 
A limitation of this analysis is that it has, so far, not taken into account transmission 
constraints in constructing the residual demand curves. Such constraints would have the 
effect of decreasing the residual demand elasticity and thus increasing the potential to 
exercise market power. 
 
 
3.2 Behavioural Indices and Analysis 
 
Whereas structural indices look to find the potential for market power, behavioural 
indices typically examine the actual conduct of companies, looking for evidence of the 
exercise of market power.  This often involves examining individual bid prices and 
quantities.  As mentioned earlier, high prices (or low quantities offered) are not, in and of 
themselves, evidence of market power. The challenge therefore is to develop meaningful 
indices and analyses that can discriminate between high prices resulting from genuine 
scarcity as opposed to the exercise of market power.  The problem that often arises, 
however, is that such analysis often requires detailed data for which there are issues of 
availability, access and confidentiality.   
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3.2.1 Bid-Cost Margins 
 
In a competitive market, price-taking companies should bid at marginal cost.  Therefore, 
the comparison of a generator’s bid with its marginal cost is an important measure in 
determining the exercise of market power in electricity markets.  If a company is 
frequently bidding in prices well in excess of marginal cost (whether it is setting the 
system price or not), it may well be exercising market power.  Therefore there have been 
a number of empirical studies examining bid and cost data seeking to determine the extent 
to which market power has been exercised.  The results of these studies are usually 
expressed in terms of the Lerner Index (LI) or Price-Cost Margin Index (PCMI): 
  
P
MCPLI −=  
 
MC
MCPPCMI −=  
 
Under a uniform price auction, the indices can be applied to individual company bids, in 
which case the appropriate marginal cost is that of the bidding company. Under 
discriminatory price auctions, the application of price-cost margin is only appropriate to 
the marginal generator.  In either case, a perfectly competitive market is presumed to 
offer no margin above marginal cost, and hence the LI and PCMI are zero.   
 
One of the earliest examples of price-cost margin analysis was by von der Fehr and 
Harbord (1993) who analysed bid and marginal cost data for the two large conventional 
generating companies in the England and Wales pool from May 1990 to April 1991, 
using the electricity pool bid data and generator cost estimates derived from published 
thermal efficiencies and fuel prices. Their evidence showed that for the first 7-9 months 
of the market’s operation, both National Power and PowerGen bid very close to their 
(estimated) marginal costs in most periods. By early 1991 however, bidding behaviour 
had changed and both of the generators were increasingly bidding above their costs. More 
recent studies include Short and Swan (2002), Fabra and Toro (2003) and Evans and 
Green (2003), where the authors not only try to demonstrate the existence of market 
power but also attempt to explain the variations in the Lerner Index with reference to 
structural and other factors. 
 
One of the great difficulties of this empirical work is determining the appropriate 
marginal cost.  The approximation most commonly used is the variable fuel cost of the 
generator, calculated from fuel prices and thermal efficiencies (heat rates).  However 
there are problems with this approach: 
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 There are other variable costs that are difficult to quantity, such as 
commitment decisions and increased cost of equipment degradation if used 
outside of designated parameters. 
 Variable costs do not necessarily approximate marginal costs for units with 
substantial opportunity costs (e.g. hydro electricity resources, generation with 
significant environmental restrictions, export market alternatives) (Brennan, 
2003). 
 Variable costs data may be confidential and difficult to obtain and audit. 
 Questions remain over whether the appropriate measure is long run marginal 
cost rather than short run marginal cost.  
 
Furthermore, even in a perfectly competitive market, the market price can exceed the 
marginal cost of the marginal producer if supply is constrained. The above-cost pricing is 
sometimes referred to as scarcity pricing and is not a demonstration of market power. 
Furthermore it fluctuates and cannot be easily ‘factored out’. In many electricity markets, 
the design of the electricity auction is such that the market price is set at the offer price of 
the last accepted supply bid. If this price does not clear the market (demand is still greater 
than supply), then raising the bid of the marginal generator has the beneficial effect of 
raising the price towards the competitive price. Stoft (2002) describes this as “negative 
market power”. Some studies set the price-cost margin to zero in hours where there is no 
spare capacity, ensuring that high prices at these times are not seen as evidence of market 
power. 
  
Thus given all these issues, even if a study uncovers a large price-cost margin, it is still 
difficult to say conclusively whether this is due to abuse of market power or estimation 
error.  This was well illustrated in the highly contentious hearings to determine the 
refunds to utilities from suspected market power abuse by a number of generators during 
the California crises, 2000-2001. 
 
An alternative to comparing bids with estimates of marginal costs is to compare bids with 
prior bids submitted by the same company when the market was assessed to be 
competitive (Power Pool of Alberta, 2002).  However, variations in bids are still possible, 
given changes in costs, even in a competitive market, so prior bids or ‘reference’ bids are 
usually indexed to fuel and other costs, thus reintroducing most of the previous criticisms 
of estimating marginal costs.  Nevertheless, screening tools using such approximated 
reference bids can be used to identify changes in bidding patterns that fall outside of 
established thresholds.    
 
3.2.2 Net Revenue Benchmark Analysis 
 
Another type of analysis employing cost data is net revenue benchmark analysis. As was 
mentioned earlier, high net revenue is not proof of market power (just as high prices are 
not proof). Nevertheless, net revenue is still considered by many researchers to be a 
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useful figure to monitor and some empirical work has been conducted to attempt to 
estimate the net revenue of classes of generation.  As well as indicating the possibility of 
abnormal profits due to market power, tracking net revenue in markets with price-cap 
mitigation may also useful to determine if peak generation earns enough revenue to cover 
fixed costs. 
 
In the long run, the revenues from the energy, capacity, and ancillary services markets 
should cover the costs of a new generating plant, including a competitive return on 
investment.  Revenues consistently below this level would discourage entry into the 
market, eventually putting upward pressure on prices. On the other hand, revenues above 
this level should lead to new entrants and exert downward pressure on prices. The margin 
between a plant’s market revenues and its variable costs (primarily fuel for fossil units) 
contributes to the recovery of its fixed costs, including non-variable operating and 
maintenance expenses and capital costs. This margin can be estimated, given the variable 
costs of a typical new generating unit, hourly energy-clearing prices in the region, and 
estimates of capacity and ancillary services revenue.  In a competitive market without 
market failures competitive entry would occur with the most cost effective technology, 
this suggests that net-revenue does not need to cover fixed costs of existing technologies. 
 
In a recent study of the New England electricity markets, Joskow (2003) used a form of 
net revenue benchmark analysis to demonstrate that the energy markets do not provide 
sufficient scarcity rents to recover the annualized fixed costs (defined as amortized capital 
costs plus fixed operating and maintenance costs) of a unit operating only during periods 
of scarcity. He concludes that, without enhancements, the existing New England energy 
and reserves markets are unlikely to provide the necessary incentives for investment in 
new generating capacity to maintain existing reliability levels.  
 
3.2.3 Economic Withholding 
 
Stoft (2001, p.371) has argued that the most basic approach to detecting market power is 
to look for “missed opportunities”: If a generator would profit (in expectation) from the 
sale of an additional unit of electricity, assuming the market price would not change, and 
the generator chooses not to sell, it has exercised market power.  Thus, according to this 
view, the focus on assessment of market power in electricity should not be on price but on 
output, looking for generation capacity that would have been profitable to run at 
prevailing market prices, but was not.15  
 
The aim of ‘withholding analysis’ is to identify generation capacity that would have been 
profitable at prevailing market prices but was withheld from sale. As mentioned earlier, 
there are two types of withholding – economic withholding, where output is reduced 
because it is bid into the market above competitive prices, and physical withholding, 
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where output is not bid into the market at all.  Economic withholding is examined here 
and physical withholding is discussed in the next section. 
 
Economic withholding is measured by estimating an “output gap”, which is defined as the 
difference between the unit’s capacity that is economic at the prevailing market price and 
amount that is actually produced by the unit (Patton et.al., 2002). This measure was 
introduced by Joskow and Kahn (2002) in an analysis of market power in the California 
electricity market. 
 
The simplest definition of the output gap is: 
 
 Qiecon – Qiprod  
 
where Qiecon is the economic level of output for unit i given the market 
price and competitive bid for the unit, and 
Qiprod is actual production of unit i. 
 
In order to determine, Qiecon, the economic level of output, a proxy is required for the 
competitive bid for the unit.  As with the bid-cost margin discussion above, this is usually 
based on estimating the variable costs of the unit (fuel, etc) and/combined with previous 
bids from presumed competitive periods. Obviously, all the previously mentioned 
criticisms of these estimates similarly apply.  In order to avoid this issue, Joskow and 
Kahn (2002) only examined those hours where prices were very high, such that it could 
be presumed that most or all of the production units would have competitive bids below 
the market price.  The actual production, Qiprod, of a unit also needs to be adjusted in order 
to take account of transmission constraints, forced outages, and other factors that affect 
the actual production which are not due to market power conduct.  
 
A positive value of an estimate of the output gap implies the existence of economic 
withholding, to the extent that there is no other explanation for the gap.  Where this gap is 
small (e.g. less than 1% of capacity) it may provide some comfort that economic 
withholding is not a serious problem. However, as with price-cost margins, the margin of 
error in estimating a number of inputs to this index leaves open to question the 
significance of any particular result.  What may be more useful is relating the output gap 
to incentives to exploit market power.  Here we examine the variation in the gap and 
determine if it is related to factors that are theoretically known to influence the ability to 
exercise market power.  For example, Patton et.al., (2002) proposed two empirical 
hypotheses in their analysis of the output gap: 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
15 Brennan (2002, 2003) has also argued strongly for a output focused approach to analysing 
market power in light of the difficulties of estimating and interpreting the price-cost margins. 
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 the incentive to withhold should increase during periods of high demand when 
prices are relatively sensitive to changes in output and thus, ceteris paribus, 
withholding should increase under high demand; 
 the incentive to withhold should be greater in a company with a larger generation 
portfolio and thus, ceteris paribus, withholding will be greater in larger 
companies. 
 
They found that in New England, the output analysis rejected the hypothesis of the 
exercise of market power as there were declining levels of the output gap with increasing 
demand and lower levels of output gap for larger participants. 
 
3.2.4 Physical Withholding 
 
With physical withholding, the generator’s resources are not bid into the market 
(physically withdrawn) by declaring a ‘derating’ of the generating unit, i.e., lowering the 
unit’s high operating limit (“HOL”).  There are generally two categories of generator 
deratings – generator outages where the HOL is generally reduced to zero, and other 
deratings where the HOL is set at a positive value below the unit’s maximum capability 
(Patton et.al., 2002).   
 
The derating quantities analyzed usually exclude planned outages and long-term forced 
outages because they are much less likely to constitute strategic physical withholding and 
including them could mask true physical withholding. 
 
Using deratings data to determine the exercise of market power faces very similar issues 
to output gap analysis: unit outages and other deratings occur under perfectly competitive 
conditions as well as noncompetitive condition.  The evidence of deratings alone cannot 
provide evidence for the exercise of market power. However, similar statistical methods 
to those described in output analysis can be used to evaluate the pattern of deratings that 
may signal a physical withholding concern. The main problem here is estimating the 
counterfactual reliability of each unit, which may depend on the intensity of previous use 
and the care with which it has been maintained. The first question is whether the observed 
outage rate over some period can be demonstrated to be significantly higher than that 
expected for this unit (observed over a comparable period in the past) or a similar unit 
(type, age, maintenance history). There may be disagreements on what the counterfactual 
reliability is (e.g. because the unit may be claimed to be less worth maintaining than 
“comparable” units), in which case it may be preferable to look for a systematic 
relationship between outage and periods when the outage raised company profits. 
 
The difficulty of such analysis is illustrated by the debate on the California crisis. Joskow 
and Kahn (2002) identified evidence of companies withholding output. However, Hogan 
et.al. (2004) were provided with a data set of a company involved in California. Outage 
rates of the selected plants increased during the crisis - as suggested by Joskow and Kahn. 
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But Hogan et.al. (2004) suggest that higher utilisation could explain the increased outage 
rate. If utilisation is assumed to be the main driver for outage rates, then a hazard rate 
analysis explains the higher outages during the crisis. The effect of sample selection bias, 
the question about the relationship between utilisation and outage rate, the expected 
impact of liberalisation to increase availability, and the expected impact that higher 
demand would induce generators to postpone and accelerate maintenance etc. might still 
be addressed in further work on this topic - the discussion illustrates the challenge of 
identifying and proving physical withholding. 
 
 
3.3   Simulation Models 
 
Most of the above indices are constructed as simple ratios or differences using market or 
structural data.  In this section we look at more sophisticated modelling exercises which 
attempt to simulate some aspects of the market for the purposes of ex-post comparison 
with actual market outcomes or ex-ante simulations of possible market outcomes given a 
particular market structure and design.  
 
 
3.3.1 Competitive Benchmark Analysis 
 
The basic idea of competitive benchmark analysis is to develop an estimate of the market 
price that would result if all companies behaved as price-takers (i.e. if no company 
attempted to exercise market power) and to compare that price to the observed market 
price.  Compared to the simple application of the Lerner Index to the actual price-setting 
(marginal) producer (as discussed above with bid-cost margins), this form of analysis 
does not assume that the marginal producer in reality is the same as the marginal producer 
under competitive conditions.  As with simple bid-cost margin indices, the determination 
of an appropriate competitive benchmark is not uncontroversial. 
 
The most common form of competitive benchmark analysis involves estimating the 
marginal cost of production of the marginal generator by simulating a hypothetical 
competitive market.  This is done by collecting data on the generation technologies that 
are present in the market and then estimating a supply curve for each trading period by 
stacking generators from least expensive to most expensive.  
 
Applied to the U.K electricity market by Wolfram (1999), this approach was refined to 
include detailed production data (Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak, 1999) as well as 
environmental costs (Joskow and Kahn 2001) in studies of the California market. Mansur 
(2001) adapts this approach to the PJM market. FERC’s Standard Market Design Notice 
of Proposed Rule-making (2002) has recommended that the annual assessment of market 
performance should include the comparison of actual market results with a simulated 
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benchmark for competitive market, but does not specify how the benchmark should be 
obtained. 
 
As with the use of simple bid-cost margin, the major concern with this type of analysis is 
the simplifications that are typically required in order to construct the marginal costs 
estimates. Examples of these simplifications include modeling in a static setting, not 
incorporating start-up costs or minimum load effects, and condensing the market into a 
single location with a single price.  The danger is that these simplifications may in fact 
underestimate marginal cost by not correctly incorporating the complexities of the real 
electricity market (Guthrie and Bidbeck, 2001).  Thus in a review of a number of 
competitive benchmark market simulation models, Harvey and Hogan (2002) conclude: 
 
Drawing inferences regarding competition based on comparisons between actual prices 
and those simulated in these simple models could produce substantial errors. The 
difference between the actual and simulated prices could arise from the real-world 
constraints omitted from the model in conjunction with purely competitive behavior, or 
the difference could arise from the exercise of market power by sellers that are able to 
raise prices because of constraints omitted from the model. One simply cannot tell from 
these simulations. The error is larger than the effect being estimated. 
 
As with bid-cost margin indices, another means of calculating a competitive benchmark 
which tries to avoid cost data is to base it on some estimate from in-merit bids during 
prior periods that are deemed competitive (FERC 2002b). The advantage of this approach 
is that the data needed are easier to obtain in the normal course of business and raise 
fewer issues of information confidentiality than approaches based on detailed generator 
production costs. However, reliance on generator bids rather than independent assessment 
of costs leaves open the relationship between competitive benchmark and the costs of 
production, raising the issue of whether this approach satisfies the need to assess whether 
loads are being served at least cost. 
  
3.3.2 Oligopoly Simulation Models 
 
Oligopoly simulation models are perhaps one of the most powerful tools in exploring 
market power by explicitly incorporating into one model many of the structural, 
behavioural and market design factors that are related to market power, including 
concentration, demand elasticity, supply curve bidding, forward contracting, and in some 
cases transmission constraints.  Using a game theoretic framework these models can be 
calibrated with cost data to predict the market prices or Lerner Index of a market with a 
given structure and design. 
 
Probably the most popular model of behaviour is Cournot competition under which 
companies choose their levels of output knowing that their strategy and the strategies of 
other companies will affect the market equilibrium. However, it is not clear whether it is 
the best model of the behaviour of electricity generators, as generally companies can also 
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choose the prices at which they offer electricity.  The well known alternative is the 
Bertrand model of oligopoly in which participants choose prices to sell their output. 
However, Borenstein et al. (1999) contend that Bertrand competition is inappropriate 
because it assumes that each company can expand output sufficiently to serve the entire 
market, which is unlikely to be the case in electricity markets. Indeed, Tirole (2002) has 
shown that models of Bertrand competition with capacity constraints may have equilibria 
that are closer to the Cournot outcome.  Klemperer and Meyer (1989) provide a solution 
to a model of oligopoly in which companies choose a “supply function” relating their 
quantity of output to the market price, which is close approximation of what usually 
happens in electricity marketplace. However, a drawback of this method is that there may 
be a wide range of possible equilibria. 
 
The cost of such flexibility in modelling market power is the difficulty associated with 
determining a number of inputs into the model.  For example, the level of forward 
contracting or demand elasticity is often an educated guess and unfortunately the results 
are often sensitive to these assumptions.  However, to the extent that these assumptions 
remain constant under comparative analysis (e.g. how will the competitiveness of the 
market change if the number of market participants increase from 2 to 4) the analysis is 
still valuable. 
 
Following the early ‘small-scale’ simulations of Green and Newbery (1992) and Lucas 
and Taylor (1993), Harbord and von der Fehr (1995) undertook the first large-scale 
simulation study of the potential for the exercise of market power in a wholesale 
electricity market for the Industry Commission of Australia. A number of researchers 
have since taken up this approach, including Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) and 
Borenstein, Bushnell and Knittel (1999).   
 
An interesting recent European example of a market simulation model, especially since it 
has been developed by a TSO (Eltra) in conjunction with regulatory authorities, is the 
MARS model of the Nord Pool area.  The model accounts for thermal, hydro, nuclear and 
wind power, and includes transmission constraints. Prices, exchanges, etc. are calculated 
on an hourly basis.  The model has been applied to investigate the market power potential 
of the dominant producers in the region. 
 
In another interesting line of research, some researchers have used detailed data on 
demand and generator bids and marginal costs to compare actual bid curves to the 
theoretical benchmark ex-post optimal bids.  This work is in some sense an extension of 
the residual demand analysis of Frank Wolak. In an analysis of the Texas balancing 
market, Hortacsu and Puller (2003) found, for large companies, a close fit between the 
actual bid schedule and the ex-post optimal bid schedule. They believe that this is a 
confirmation that strategic equilibrium models such as the supply function equilibria 
(SFE) models are accurate descriptors of strategic agents.  There are subtleties that need 
to be addressed carefully if this approach is employed, for most markets (and certainly the 
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Texas balancing market) required market participants to submit step-function bids, not 
smooth curves. The resulting residual demand schedule is therefore typically also a step 
function, and its associated marginal revenue will coincide with the flat steps but be 
discontinuous at the steps. This problem can be handled once it is accepted that market 
participants bid in expectation of the realised residual demand schedule, but the 
econometrics are considerably more demanding, as Wolak (2003) shows. 
 
Transmission constraints can isolate markets and enhance market power. Several models 
of strategic interaction on networks have been developed (see reviews by Daxhalet and 
Smeers, 2001; Day et al., 2002; Ventosa et al., 2004). Most models of generator 
competition take a general approach of defining a market equilibrium as a set of prices, 
generation amounts, transmission flows, and consumption that satisfy each market 
participant's first-order conditions for maximizing their net benefits while clearing the 
market.  If a market solution exists that satisfies this set of conditions, it will have the 
property that no participant will want to alter their decisions unilaterally (as in a Nash 
equilibrium).  Although it is recognized that no modelling approach can precisely predict 
prices in oligopolistic markets, there appears to be agreement that equilibrium models are 
valuable for gaining insights on modes of behaviour and relative differences in efficiency, 
prices, and other outcomes of different market structures and designs (Smeers, 1997). 
  
Equilibrium market models differ in many ways, including the market mechanisms 
modelled, the type of game assumed, fidelity to the physics of power transmission, and 
computational methods. Regarding market clearing mechanisms, most studies of 
generation markets implicitly or explicitly assume a single buyer or “pool”-type 
centralized bidding process supervised by an Independent System Operator (ISO) (e.g., 
Cardell et al., 1997).  This process results in a set of publicly disclosed market clearing 
prices.  Other studies model bilateral trading with or without the presence of 
traders/arbitrageurs (Metzler et al., 2003; Wei and Smeers, 1999).  Some studies assume 
that that transmission services and energy markets are cleared simultaneously or are well 
arbitraged, while others assume a sequential process.  The practical differences between 
these formulations are assessed in Neuhoff e.a. (2004).  
 
3.4. Transmission Related Issues 
 
Transmission constraints can allow for the exercise of market power along at least four 
categories. First, most European markets allow market participants to trade within the 
country as if the network were permanently unconstrained. In such designs the TSO has 
to redispatch generation capacity in order to resolve transmission constraints. The original 
English electricity Pool offered a single price and firm transmission rights, so that plant 
that could not be dispatched because of constraints would be paid its theoretical lost profit 
(Pool Purchase Price less its own bid) to not generate. A generator assured that he is not 
required and facing little local competition might then submit very low decrement bids to 
maximize income. It may then pay to locate in an export-constrained zone to enjoy these 
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profits, even though this is exactly the wrong place to locate. The counterpart is that 
generation in import-constrained zones can bid high (and be paid its bid price if 
constrained to run out of the unconstrained merit order) and will therefore be more 
strongly motivated to locate in such zones by the presence of market power.  This was 
identified as an issue by the regulator as early as 1992, and discussed in Offer’s Report on 
Constrained-on Plant (Offer, 1992).  This drew a distinction between acceptable and 
unacceptable bidding.  National Power set the bids of some plants inside import 
constraints so as to recover their costs and a reasonable profit over the course of a year, 
even reducing one plant’s bids once it appeared to be on course to over-recover.  
PowerGen, in contrast, submitted extremely high bids for two small stations shortly to be 
closed, which were constrained on while NGC carried out work to accommodate the 
closures, and was criticized for this.  NGC was encouraged to sign long-term contracts 
with plants inside import constraints, since this reduced risks for both the generator and 
the transmission operator.  Two years later, NGC was exposed to a share of the cost of 
constraints, giving the company a financial incentive to minimize them. Obviously 
generators can not only amplify the impact of existing constraints, but can also create 
constraints with their bids and require redispatch where a competitive system would be 
unconstrained. 
 
Second, if transmission constraints are explicitly addressed in the market design, either 
using nodal or zonal pricing or using physical transmission contracts, then bids that create 
constraints change the price received by all local generators.  This can make an import 
constraint even more profitable for the generators affected by it, since all of their output, 
rather than just the (perhaps relatively small) amount needed to relieve the constraint, gets 
a high price.  In contrast, it is no longer profitable to create export constraints, as they 
reduce local spot prices and therefore revenue, rather than increasing revenue in 
redispatch. 
 
Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft (2000) show for explicit treatment of transmission 
constraints that it can be profitable for generators to withhold output in order to constrain 
a transmission line into the location of the generator that would not have been constrained 
under perfect competition. Borenstein et al. (1996) cite empirical evidence from Northern 
California to this effect. Oren (1997) presents an alternative scenario with the 
transmission constraint located between two strategic generators in a three-node network. 
Stoft (1998) solves the corresponding Cournot game and Joskow and Tirole (2000) give 
the following interpretation: the transmission configuration can turn the output of 
generators at two different nodes into ‘local complements’, thereby increasing the 
incentive for a generator to withhold output, as this constrains the output of the other 
generator and increases price levels. Cardell, Hitt and Hogan (1997) show that, if strategic 
generators own generation assets at node A and B of a three-node network, they might 
increase output at node A relative to a competitive scenario if  this reduces the total 
energy delivered to node B due to loop flows and therefore increases prices at node B. 
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Third, transmission contracts, both physical and financial, can enhance the market power 
of generators and provide financial incentives to change output decisions of generators 
even as transmission constraints are and remain constrained. This was first addressed by 
Hogan (1997). Joskow and Tirole (2000) show that physical and financial transmission 
rights have almost identical properties. However, in real networks, a complete set of 
physical transmission contracts is too complex, so designs were developed to aggregate 
and simplify property rights for each individual link. Joskow and Tirole discuss different 
approaches and point out the need for rights to be obligations to transmit rather than just 
options to use the network, to ensure an efficient use of meshed networks. More to the 
point, if generators hold contracts equal to their planned output, they will have no 
incentive to misrepresent their bids. In a network with transmission constraints this 
requires that generators hold transmission contracts to complement energy contracts with 
counter parties at other locations. Joskow and Tirole (2000) assess how such transmission 
contracts can impact the exercise of market power and Gilbert et al. (2004) show how 
auction design and restrictions on ownership can reduce the exercise of market power by 
strategic generators. Since generators may choose to contract for hedging reasons, the 
problem may not be too serious, provided shortages (that greatly amplify market power) 
are not readily predicted. Where there are predicted and potentially lengthy shortages 
(e.g. a systematic shortfall in capacity that will require new build that cannot come on 
stream for some considerable time) then market power may spread to the contract market. 
Price caps on contracts are typically far less distorting than on spot markets, and a 
requirement to offer such capped contracts defensible.  
 
Fourth, particular opportunities to exploit market power might arise in settings with 
physical transmission contracts, as for example between Germany and the Netherlands. 
Market participants might, for example, participate in the transmission auction but 
subsequently not use their transmission contracts. In principle such behaviour is supposed 
to be avoided by ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ provisions. In practice it turns out to be difficult to re-
use contracts on short time frames and therefore generators in the importing region might 
benefit from reduced use of import capacity. Monitoring the level of unused contracts 
might reduce inappropriate behaviour. Joint auctions for physical transmission contracts 
provided by TSOs, rather than designs that integrate energy and transmission markets, 
could create a further opportunity for the abuse of market power. The allocation of scarce 
transmission capacity of individual bottlenecks to transmission contracts between 
different countries is based on the bids for transmission contracts. By increasing the bids 
for transmission contracts between countries A and B a market participant could in such a 
design reduce the volume of transmission contracts available for transmission between 
countries A and C. This might serve the purpose of increasing prices in country C.  
 
Only in the last case is the use of transmission contracts instrumental to the exercise of 
market power.  In the remaining cases transmission contracts provide incentives, and 
therefore a motive for the exercise of market power.  Therefore information on 
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transmission contracts or constraints can be a preliminary guide to situations where 
economic or physical withholding might be expected.  
 
Given that transmission contracts influence the incentives to exercise market power there 
is some discussion on restricting ownership of transmission contracts. If such rules are 
implemented, then they need to be monitored and in this case explicit information on 
ownership of transmission contracts needs to be collected 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
The traditional approach to measuring market competitiveness is based on the 
concentration indices, the most important being market share and HHI.  There is some 
theoretical justification for using these measures as an indicator of potential market power 
and they have the further advantage of being easy to understand.  Nevertheless, as has 
often been pointed out, they ignore many factors that contribute to the potential exercise 
of market power. In particular, demand conditions, strategic incentives (such as from 
forward contracting) and market contestability are ignored. The static nature of these 
measures may also not be appropriate for dynamic markets such as electricity where 
demand and supply conditions can change rapidly.  In practice, when calculating these 
indices there are also difficulties with regard to appropriately defining the product and 
geographic markets.  In particular, transmission constraints should be an important factor 
in such calculations but have often been ignored or crudely approximated. 
 
Empirically, there is surprisingly little evidence supporting the usefulness of market share 
and HHI in predicting market power in electricity markets.  The California experience, 
where market designers relied heavily upon low market share and HHI indices to allay 
fears of market power, clearly demonstrates the potentially misleading nature of these 
metrics.  Accordingly, it is unlikely that these indices will be the primary tool of market 
power analysis but they will most likely still serve a role in the potential screening of 
market power in long term ex-ante studies of market design or merger proposals. Perhaps 
the most important point to make is that the normal EU screens for Significant Market 
Power used in other markets are likely to greatly underestimate the potential market 
power in electricity markets. 
 
It is perhaps not surprising that the market monitor and academics most closely involved 
with the California crisis have been interested in developing alternative structural indices 
to try to address at least some of the weaknesses of the classical concentration indices.  
The Pivotal Supplier Index (PSI) introduces demand-side conditions by addressing the 
extent to which a generator’s capacity is necessary to supply the market after taking into 
account other generators’ capacity.  The index can be applied on an hour by hour basis, 
thus providing a dynamic image of the market structure and the potential to exercise 
market power. When aggregated across a period of time, the PSI essentially detects the 
frequency of monopoly power. The closely related Residual Supply Index tries to extract 
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more information by classifying the results as a continuous variable rather than a 
dichotomous variable.  Unfortunately, the measurement difficulties associated with 
defining the product and geographic market still remain.   
 
These indices have only recently been introduced as a tool for market power analysis, but 
the initial empirical results in the US are encouraging and have found significant 
correlation between the RSI and measures of the actual exercise of market power.  From 
originally being applied to the California markets, the PSI and RSI have now been 
calculated for Eastern US electricity markets and we expect these tools to become a 
standard technique in market power analysis. 
 
A more sophisticated approach to market power detection is the Residual Demand 
Analysis developed by Frank Wolak.  Like the PSI and RSI, both the demand and supply 
side of the market are accounted for, but with the added dimension of explicitly including 
the price elasticities of supply and demand.  Obviously the disadvantage of incorporating 
such information into the market power analysis is the added burden of requiring data on 
generator bids. At present, it is difficult to evaluate whether this methodology is likely to 
become a more frequently employed tool of market power analysis, although it is 
undoubtably one of the most powerful and convincing methods currently available 
 
While the structural indices examine the potential for market power, we also examined 
indices and methods that look for evidence of the actual exercise of market power. The 
most standard are the price-cost margin and the closely related Lerner index.  Indeed, 
Borenstein et al. (1999) have described the Lerner Index as the “fundamental measure of 
the exercise of market power”.  The most immediate advantage of such indices is that 
complex product and geographic market definitions are unnecessary.  The most 
significant practical obstacle to broader application of the Lerner Index is determining the 
company's marginal cost of production at any given point in time. Without a 
measurement or reasonable estimate of marginal cost, the ratio is incalculable. Here the 
main practical question is the time period over which to measure the marginal cost. If 
plant can never sell at more than short-run marginal cost, it will fail to recover its fixed 
costs and the market will not be sustainable. Nor does a high value of the short-run Lerner 
Index indicate that the market is not competitive if capacity is scarce. While the short-run 
Lerner Index can provide some insights into the transitory exercise of market power, it 
needs to be associated with an estimate based on the long-run marginal cost of generation 
before any finding of abusive behaviour can be demonstrated. Moreover, exogenous 
economic factors, such as shifts in consumer demand or the cost of inputs, can result in 
dramatic and misleading changes to the index that are unrelated to market power. 
Nonetheless, despite these criticisms, the Lerner index continues to be a prominent 
measure of market power as both an index to be calculated from actual market data as 
well as a measure of market power in market simulation models.  There is no reason to 
believe that this will change. 
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The issue of marginal cost estimation is also central to Net Revenue Benchmark analysis. 
This tool is not solely used as a method of detecting market power but is still of interest.  
As well as involving all the difficulties associated with estimating marginal cost, there are 
difficulties to interpreting the results of such net revenue benchmark analysis. 
Competitive companies and markets go through natural swings of profitability and 
unprofitability that are not necessarily related to any exercise of market power. Given the 
amount of effort required to conduct such analysis, along with the ambiguity of results, it 
is perhaps not surprising that we could not find many examples of net revenue benchmark 
studies.   
 
Withholding Analysis shifts attention away from prices and towards output – or more 
specifically, the withholding of output.  The idea is to determine if output, which could 
have been sold profitably at the competitive price, was nevertheless withheld from the 
market.  The so-called ‘output gap’ can be examined on its own or regressed against 
factors which are believed to be related to incentives for exercising market power.  In 
general it would be necessary to have an estimate of the marginal cost of production in 
order to determine whether production is economic or not. It may be possible to avoid this 
issue for high-demand high- periods where prices are clearly above avoidable costs.  At 
present, like a number of other techniques already mentioned, the few applications of 
output-gap analysis are only very recent and there is still much debate over the robustness 
of this methodology. However, we do see the potential for this tool to become a standard 
technique of market power analysis.  
 
Competitive Benchmark Analysis is a more refined form of price-cost margin analysis 
that involves simulating the competitive market price by constructing a competitive 
market supply curve.  The output metric of such analysis is typically a Lerner index that 
compares the actual market price to the simulated competitive price. This form of analysis 
has only been developed over the last five years and is becoming increasingly more 
sophisticated in terms of accounting for constraints and other factors that affect the real 
market price outcome.  The analysis is typically applied to long-term time-series (e.g. 
several years of monthly or daily data) for the purpose of market assessment reports or 
studies. However, there is nothing to prevent the real-time adoption of such models for 
daily market monitoring.  The methodology only applies to the market as a whole and 
cannot be used as a means of specifically identifying which company is exercising market 
power.  Once the presence of market power is established, further investigative tools are 
required to determine the source of market power.  The chief controversy associated with 
this tool comes, again, from the difficulties involved in defining and estimating the 
marginal costs.  The debate still continues as to the reliability of competitive benchmark 
analysis in light of such potential estimation errors. However, given the difficulties 
associated with other ex-post market power assessment tools, competitive benchmark 
analysis is likely to remain as an important monitored metric, especially for longer term 
analysis. 
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The most sophisticated forms of market power analysis are the Oligopoly Simulation 
Models.  These models have been developed over the last decade and have been applied 
to many electricity markets throughout the world. Their main application has been in ex-
ante analysis of prospective market designs and (de)merger analysis. Their flexibility in 
accounting for a number of factors known to influence market power, including demand 
elasticity, forward contracting and transmission constraints, are their chief attractive 
feature.  However, the large number of assumptions necessary to build these models 
means that the results of such analysis, while certainly interesting and indicative of 
certain market power conclusions, are almost always open to dispute.  Nevertheless, we 
see these models, which are becoming increasingly more sophisticated, as continuing to 
be employed in long term ex-ante market power analysis. Recent results, such as 
Hortascu and Puller (2003) and Wolak (2003), indicate that simulated bidding behaviour 
can provide useful insights into actual market behavior.   
 
While most electricity systems exhibit transmission constraints, so far only few empirical 
assessments take explicit account of the impacts of transmission constraints in the system. 
Transmission constraints increase the incentives and opportunities to exercise market 
power along various pathways. First, the UK experience showed that even where the 
energy market design ignores transmission constraints and allows generation companies 
to trade as if there were no constraints, the generation companies can deliberately distort 
their bids to exploit potential constraints. Generation companies can then profit by their 
bids and offers to the system operator who needs to resolve these transmission constraints 
to achieve a feasible dispatch schedule. Second, when the market design within or 
between areas explicitly addresses transmission constraints then market participants can 
no longer ‘abuse’ export constraints, but can increase or even create import constraints. 
Third, ownership of transmission contracts influences the revenue streams of generation 
companies, and can therefore provide incentives to mitigate or enhance market power. 
Fourth, in systems with physical transmission contracts, market participants can exercise 
market power to change flow patterns and therefore influence equilibrium prices in 
different regions, typically by withholding transmission rights. ‘Use it or lose it’ 
provisions address such behaviour, but require monitoring. If the allocation of 
transmission capacity between various regions is based on a joint auction, then physical 
transmission contracts allow market participants to distort their bids in order to distort the 
flow pattern.  
 
The long list of incentives and opportunities to exercise market power in networks 
suggests that market monitoring cannot ignore this aspect of market power. The TSOs are 
crucial in providing information on flow patterns and location-specific demand and 
generation. However, as TSOs have discretion in their decisions, it is impossible to 
deduce from the flow patterns whether TSOs detected that a flow-gate/corridor is 
transmission constrained. It is therefore also important to record which transmission lines 
were announced to be constrained, how much capacity was made available in short-term 
markets and which transmission lines were actually constrained during the dispatch. The 
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objective is to replicate the information set available to strategic players at different 
decision points and to capture their actions. Data on the ownership and the price paid for 
transmission contracts is required to assess the impact on the incentive to exercise market 
power and to verify whether distorted bids resulted in distorted flow patterns.  
A second motivation to collect information on the allocation of transmission capacity by 
the TSO relates to the understanding of the TSO behaviour. Currently the only criteria 
available to evaluate TSOs behaviour is whether the system was operating uninterrupted. 
However, efforts of TSOs to use the transmission network effectively are not monitored 
or evaluated. If flow patterns and system conditions are recorded, then the performance of 
TSOs, the set of dispatch rules and the market design can be better evaluated. 
 
The relative strengths and weakness of the various market power detection techniques are 
summarized in Table 3. 
 
The main conclusion of this chapter is that the range of market power detection tools has 
expanded over the last 5-10 years, and although there is no definitive method for each of 
the four main categories of market power detection previously outlined in table 1, the 
more recent tools are better able to capture relevant factors and dynamic considerations 
that are not present in traditional tools such as concentration ratios or the Lerner index.  
However, with these advances come associated theoretical or data estimation issues that 
can blur the reliability of the results.  As such, the pragmatic approach to market power 
detection is to gather together a number of metrics with the hope of constructing a 
consistent story of the competitiveness of the companies or market as a whole.  Such a 
pragmatic approach is evident in the next section where we examine the range of data and 
indices tracked by market monitoring units.  
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Table 3 - Summary of Market Power Detection Methods 
                                     Category Strengths Weaknesses Popularity 
Structural Indices 
and Analysis 
    
Market Share and 
HHI 
Ex-ante  Easy to understand. 
 Theoretical justification under 
certain assumptions. 
 Simplest versions only require 
sales or capacity data. 
 Little empirical justification. 
 Ignores demand side, 
strategic incentives and often 
congestion issues. 
 Does not fit well to dynamic 
market conditions. 
 Difficulties in determining 
appropriate geographic 
region. 
 Standard tool for many 
decades. 
 Increasingly 
recognized as a limited 
metric. 
Pivotal Supplier 
Indicator and 
Residual Supply 
Index 
Ex-ante 
Ex-post 
 Takes into account demand 
side conditions. 
 Can track dynamically 
changing markets. 
 Applicable at local market level 
as well as system level. 
 Some empirical support. 
 Difficulties in determining 
appropriate geographic 
region. 
 Ignores potential of 
correlated behaviour (e.g. 
Cournot or collusive 
behaviour).  
 Ignores elasticities and 
market contestability 
(entry/exit) factors. 
 Recent tool (c2000) 
but increasingly being 
applied. 
 
Residual Demand 
Analysis 
Ex-post  Takes into account elasticities 
of supply and demand. 
 Theoretical justification – link 
to Lerner Index. 
 Requires bid data. 
 So far limited empirical 
work. 
 Recent tool (c2000). 
Uncertain as to future 
popularity. 
Behavioural Indices 
and Analysis 
    
Bid-Cost Margins 
(Lerner Index) 
Ex-ante 
Ex-post 
 Easy to understand 
 Does not require a geographic 
market definition. 
 Useful metric for ex-ante 
theoretical models as well as 
ex-post empirical analysis. 
 
 Difficulties in determining 
costs or appropriate 
competitive ‘reference’ 
levels. 
 Margins affected by factors 
other than market power -
interpretation difficulties. 
 Standard tool. 
 Confidence should 
grow as cost estimation 
techniques continue to 
improve. 
Net Revenue 
Benchmark Analysis 
Ex-post   Considers long run 
considerations such as 
investment incentives and 
entry/exit issues. 
 Difficulties in determining 
costs. 
 Results are difficult to 
interpret in light of other 
factors affecting profits. 
 Relatively recent tool 
but may grow in 
popularity. 
Withholding Analysis 
(Output gap analysis) 
Ex-post  Focuses directly on most basic 
MP strategy – withholding 
 Under certain assumptions can 
avoid cost estimation. 
 Correlation analysis can trigger 
further analysis without 
preliminary auditing of 
outages. 
 Accounting for all ‘small’ 
details of production 
decision (e.g. ramp rates etc) 
is difficult. 
 Actual auditing of 
deratings/outages is difficult. 
 Initial empirical results still 
controversial. 
 Recent tool (c2002) 
and still controversial, 
but its important 
complementary role to 
price analysis will 
ensure continued 
development. 
Simulation Models     
Competitive 
Benchmark Analysis 
Ex-post  Takes account of entire market 
in a refined version of price-
cost margin analysis. 
 Can provide quantitative 
estimate of efficiency and 
welfare loss from market 
power. 
 Difficulties in determining 
costs or appropriate 
competitive ‘reference’ 
levels. 
 Cannot identify individual 
generators exercising market 
power. 
 Introduced in 1999 and 
has lead to numerous 
studies since. 
 Still controversial 
given the many 
estimation issues. 
Oligopoly Models Ex-ante  Integrates many market power 
factors into one framework 
(e.g. demand, contracting 
incentives, transmission 
constraints). 
 Large number of 
assumptions negates 
certitude of quantitative 
conclusions. 
 Introduced in early 
1990s and applied 
widely since. 
 Still controversial. 
Transmission 
Monitoring 
Ex-ante 
Ex-post 
 Transmission constraints are an 
important issue in market 
power monitoring and are often 
ignored. 
 Analysis usually requires 
data on bidding, output, 
transmission rights 
ownership and constraints. 
 Given the interaction with 
market design and network 
structure, case specific 
analysis is very often 
required. 
 An important aspect of 
many analyses of 
market power, but will 
continue to be 
constrained by the 
difficulties of carrying 
out analysis. 
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4.   Market Monitoring and Analysis in Practice 
 
4.1      Approaches to Market Monitoring Units 
  
As we might expect, different countries have taken different approaches to the issue of 
how to monitor their electricity markets.  Practically every country which has liberalised 
its electricity industry has an economic regulator for the industry.  The economic 
regulator often has some overall responsibility for the state of the electricity wholesale 
market, but does not necessarily carry out the detailed monitoring itself.  In many cases, 
the body set up to run an electricity market was required to set up a market monitoring 
unit when it was established.  Typically, these units are located within the market operator 
and have access to its data, but are given some functional independence to ensure that 
they cannot be captured by the operator.  This might just imply direct reporting lines to 
the operator’s board, but many monitoring units are headed, or at least supervised, by 
independent expert committees.  
 
It is hardly surprising that it is easiest to obtain information on market monitoring where a 
formal unit has been established in this way.  We provide more information on the market 
monitoring units of four US markets, Ontario, Australia, Singapore and Nord Pool in the 
appendix to this paper.  The main reason for concentrating on market monitors from 
outside the EU is that such countries have, in general, developed market monitoring 
further than most European countries. In this section, we summarise the main themes that 
emerge from the detailed studies. 
 
Many other markets, however, do not have a formal market monitor of this kind.  Does 
this mean that they are not monitored?  In England and Wales, the electricity regulator 
was responsible for competition in the wholesale market, and had a number of powers to 
enforce this.  A small team in the Office of Electricity Regulation was tasked with 
monitoring events in the Electricity Pool.  The team received price information and 
attended the meetings of the Pool Executive Committee and other groups, but did not 
have the resources for detailed analysis of factors behind price movements.  The team 
largely relied upon industry participants to alert it to problems beyond the most obvious 
ones.  There were many large buyers with the ability and incentive to spot trouble when it 
occurred, and the National Grid Company, which operated the market, also provided 
information.  To some extent, this was because the company’s regulatory licence required 
it to give the regulator any information he required.  NGC was happy to cooperate at a 
“working level” on a day-to-day basis, presumably to promote a good relationship with its 
regulator, although it is worth stressing that the staff involved in monitoring the wholesale 
market were separate from those involved in regulating transmission prices.  When the 
regulator wanted to carry out a more detailed investigation of market behaviour, this was 
often with the help of outside consultants. 
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If a transmission operator does not have to give market monitoring information to its 
regulator under a legal duty, it may still have a financial incentive to act against market 
power.  While a “pure” independent system operator has few financial resources, and can 
only pass the costs of running the system through to buyers, a transmission owner may be 
exposed to some of these costs.  From 1994 onwards, the National Grid Company in 
England and Wales was given an incentive scheme to reduce “Uplift”, the part of the Pool 
price that covered the cost of keeping the system stable, including the cost of resolving 
transmission constraints.  The company therefore had a financial incentive to act against 
market power that might raise this cost.  Other transmission companies may not face an 
explicit incentive scheme, but could find that they cannot pass cost increases straight on 
to consumers, perhaps for reasons of regulatory lag.  In these circumstances, they also 
have an incentive to cooperate with regulators to combat market power that could 
increase system costs. 
 
However it is organised, what makes a market monitor effective?  Wolak (2004) suggests 
some desirable features: 
 
 A forward-looking process can seek out small flaws in the market design or market 
structure before they have time to become significant market failures.  It is 
extremely hard to undo the wealth transfers caused by high prices after the event, 
and much better to prevent them from occurring in the first place.  
 Support from the regulator is important if the unit is to be more than a commentator 
on market events, and to obtain a response to the issues that it identifies as 
important. 
 A consistent approach will help to ensure that the market monitor’s actions are 
understood by all market participants, and that they do not act in undesirable ways 
because they did not understand the likely consequences 
 A transparent approach, releasing data on a timely basis (whether submitted to or 
produced by the market monitor) will help to promote confidence in the efficient 
operation of the market, and can aid the market monitoring process as well.  
Allowing outsiders to perform their own analyses may aid the detection of market 
power. 
 Independence of the market monitor is the best way of avoiding the risk that its 
analysis would be distorted to favour one stakeholder over another. 
 
While the details vary from market to market, the three key activities of a market 
monitoring unit are to: 
 
 Analyse the market on a continuous basis to identify potential problems that need 
more study, and to screen for undesirable behaviour.  In some markets, this can 
lead to automatic real-time mitigation. 
 Investigate any problems identified by its own screening, or by complaints from 
other stakeholders  
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 Report on the results of its analysis and investigations on a regular basis 
 
 
4.2 Data and Indices Tracked by Market Monitoring Divisions 
 
There is no universally accepted set of market monitoring statistics and indices. In 
practice there is a large set of data and indices that are monitored on varying time scales.  
The appendix gives detailed information on the practices of a number of formal market 
monitoring units, while in this section we identify the common themes.  
 
No single set of metrics can cover all possibilities within a category, and there are grey 
areas between defined categories.  Nevertheless the following groupings serve as a useful 
guide: 
 
 Market Prices, Demand and System Conditions 
 Market Structure Indices 
 Supplier Indices and Analysis 
 Market Performance Indices and Analysis 
 
 
4.2.1 Market Prices and System Conditions 
 
The level of market prices is perhaps the most obvious thing there is to monitor!  
However, a moderate market price can be a sign of market abuse if it comes at a time 
when demand is low.  This means that prices must be related to system conditions; most 
importantly, the level of demand, but also the level of available capacity, and indicators 
of transmission congestion.  Although not all these measurements are directly tied to a 
particular index of market power, they can sometimes indicate irregularities in the market 
that may be symptomatic of market power problems. Furthermore, such data may also 
facilitate the development of other standard metrics of market power. These statistics are 
typically reported on a monthly, seasonal, and an annual basis, but should be collected for 
every period in which the market is operating. 
 
We can differentiate between the raw data collected by the market monitor, and the 
statistics that are subsequently derived from them.  The raw data can include: 
 
 Prices 
 Energy prices in the real-time market, day-ahead market, and forward or 
futures markets (which may depend on price reporters in an over-the-
counter market where there is no formal exchange). 
 Energy prices in adjacent markets (which should move together with 
prices in this market, unless congested transmission separates the markets). 
 Prices for ancillary services, such as reserve 
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 Prices in the capacity market(s), if they exist 
 Fuel prices determine the costs of most generators, and so it should be 
useful to record spot and forward prices for the fuels used in the market, 
typically natural gas, coal and oil. 
 The identity of the price-setting unit(s), in markets where identifiable units 
set prices; otherwise, of the price-setting company or companies 
 
 Demand Conditions 
 Forecasted system demand will be a key driver of the price in day-ahead 
markets 
 Actual system total demand will affect the real-time markets, particularly 
when it differs significantly from the forecast 
 
 Capacity Availability 
 The total generating capacity owned by each generator will show whether 
the market is generally well-supplied relative to demand  
 Actual declared availability at each point in time shows whether the 
market is well-supplied, relative to demand, at that time  
 The number and size of generating unit planned, unplanned and forced 
outages may explain why available capacity is less than total capacity  
 
 Transmission Congestion 
 The number and size of transmission planned, unplanned and forced 
outages can affect the number of constraints on the system 
 Transmission constraints on the system, with the nature of each constraint 
(thermal, voltage, stability), and the limiting element in the grid; 
information on which transmission lines were announced to be constrained 
and which transmission lines were actually constrained during the 
dispatch. 
 Counter-trades (where these are used to resolve congestion), including the 
identity of the constrained plants, the MW constrained on and off, and the 
payments made 
 Total MW constrained on and off (in a counter-trading system) 
 Total constrained on and off payments 
 Information on transmission contracts 
 
Given that this raw data is available, there are some statistics that can usefully be derived 
and monitored for signs of any problems in the market: 
 
 Price Trends 
 Moving averages or other trend analysis of prices can reveal patterns 
which might be hidden by day-to-day volatility. 
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 Frequency of price hitting market price cap, when a cap exists, is an 
indicator of how prices might change if the cap were adjusted or removed 
 Frequency of other bid mitigation if some is permitted  
 Volatility measures (variance, min-max prices) 
 
 Price Comparisons 
 Comparing the real-time price with the day-ahead price or forecasted price 
can show whether the earlier markets are an efficient predictor of real-time 
events, and highlight unexpected deviations. 
 Comparing the market price with the prices in adjacent markets can show 
whether efficient arbitrage is taking place, although this depends upon the 
availability of transmission capacity 
 Comparing the price for energy and for ancillary services can show 
whether the prices reflect the relevant opportunity costs of offering the 
services 
 Comparing the market price with the system load can show whether high 
prices are due to high demand levels 
 Comparing the market price with fuel costs can show whether changes in 
final prices reflect changes in input prices, and vice versa 
 
 Price Setting Analysis 
 Is the frequency with which particular units (or companies) set the market 
price correlated with whether they are a net buyer or net seller in that 
market, with the level of demand, the time of day, or some other market 
characteristic?   
 Are there any correlations with the level of the market price they set?  A 
net seller will generally want higher prices, and a net buyer will want 
lower prices, for example. 
 
 Demand and Capacity Comparisons 
 Capacity margin – the ratio of maximum generation capacity (ignoring 
outages) to demand is an indicator of the general tightness of the market, 
and likely to be related to the level of prices 
 Supply cushion – the ratio of the difference between total offered volume 
and system demand to total offered volume measures the tightness of the 
market at a particular time. 
 
 Congestion Analysis 
 Is it possible to identify units which have caused constraints by their 
bidding?  
 Does the price-setting algorithm ever set nodal prices above the highest 
bid taken? 
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 Is there are correlation between changes in a unit’s bid price and the 
frequency with which it is constrained on or off 
 
4.2.2 Market Structure Indices 
 
A second set of indicators relate to the market structure, underlying features of the market 
that will, in most cases, change only gradually.  This means that some of the data need 
only be collected periodically, rather than on a continuous basis. 
 
The raw data in this area consist of information on generator market shares and on the 
price responsiveness of demand.  That information can then be analysed to give the 
pivotal supplier index and residual supply index described in section 3: 
 
 Market Shares 
 Market shares for each company can be collected, and concentration 
indices can be calculated.  These can be based on shares of capacity, or of 
output.  In some contexts, market shares within a particular sub-set of units 
can be of particular interest, which could include a subdivision on the basis 
of : 
 Fuel type  
 Price setting units 
 Location (i.e., units within a given load pocket.) 
When output shares are used, these can be collected at various frequencies, 
ranging from hourly to annual; monthly and daily shares are also sometimes 
reported 
 
 Hirschman-Herfindahl Indices 
 The market share data can also be used to calculate HHI figures, on 
exactly the same bases as the concentration ratios.  
 
 Demand Responsiveness 
The responsiveness of demand to changes in price affects generators’ ability to 
exploit a large share of the supply side of the market and drive up its price.  It 
can be measured by:  
 MW of demand response capabilities in energy and ancillary service 
markets 
 Load weighted % of demand bids that are price responsive 
 % of load with real-time metering capability 
 Price elasticity of demand 
 Changes in those demand response capabilities (spread of technology) 
 
 
 Pivotal Supply Analysis 
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 This can be performed in each of the hourly, day-ahead and ancillary 
services markets 
 
 Residual Supply Indices 
 Similarly, these can be calculated for each market, including hourly, day-
ahead and ancillary services. 
 
Having calculated these indices, the market monitor can seek to establish the relationship 
between the market price and these measures of market competitiveness.  If it is possible 
to establish the levels at which market performance will be broadly acceptable, then these 
levels can be used as a screen for analyzing merger proposals as described in section 3. 
 
4.2.3 Supplier Indices and Analysis 
 
The focus of supplier analysis is on the behaviour of individual suppliers who might have 
market power.  In this area, the raw data consist of bid and outage information.  The first 
transformation may be to produce reference bids16, which indicate how each unit behaves 
in normal conditions.  These will not identify a sustained abuse of market power, but a 
change in conduct in response to a short-term change in circumstances will be spotted.  
Further analysis can then focus on identifying the circumstances that might make such a 
change in behaviour profitable, and checking whether the generator’s behaviour does 
indeed change in response.  Similar analyses can relate unit outages to market conditions. 
 
 Market bids 
The full set of bids to each organized market must be available to the market 
monitor, including prices, availability, and any technical constraints (such as ramp 
rates) that are taken into account when setting prices. 
 
 Outages 
Data should be held on the number and duration of  
 Deratings, including the number of MW by which the unit’s capacity is 
reduced 
 Scheduled and forced outages 
 
 Reference Bids 
These should be constructed for each market into which a unit normally bids (e.g. 
day-ahead markets, real-time markets, and reserve markets), and can be estimated 
in various ways: 
 The mean or the median of the unit’s bids over the previous X (e.g. 90) 
days for similar hours or load levels, adjusted for changes in fuel prices 
                                                 
16 The term ‘bid’ in this report is generally used in a broad sense and can refer to both buying and selling.  
More narrowly, a ‘bid’ refers to a buying submission and ‘offer’ to selling submission. 
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 The mean of the nodal price at the unit’s location during the lowest-priced 
X (e.g. 25) percent of hours that the unit was dispatched over the previous 
X (e.g. 90) days, adjusted for changes in fuel prices; 
 The mean of the bids supplied by all units of similar types. 
 The unit’s estimated marginal cost. 
 
 Bid variation 
Changes in the unit’s bids, which may be related to the abuse of market power, 
can be identified by: 
 Deviation of bids from reference price levels. 
 Deviation of bids from longer or shorter-term moving averages of prior 
bids. 
 Frequency of re-bidding from standing orders (i.e. bids which were 
automatically submitted every time unless over-ridden). 
 
 Analysis of bidding 
This can include:  
 Correlation between bids and the level of demand 
 Correlation between unit schedules or bids and the existence or magnitude 
of congestion. 
 Correlation between unit schedules or bids and the market price. 
 Comparing bid patterns between participants. 
 
 Output analysis  
The load factor, or capacity ratio, of a generation unit is equal to its actual output 
divided by its maximum generation capacity multiplied by the length of the time 
period being considered.  A falling load factor can be a sign of withholding, 
although it can also be a competitive response to market conditions. 
 
 Analysis of Outages  
This can include:  
 Correlation between outages and the market price. 
 Comparison of outage frequencies with similar generators. 
 Output gap analysis – the ratio of actual hourly output to economically 
available capacity. 
 Correlation between generator forced outages and the nodal price or 
congestion. 
 Correlation between transmission facility forced outages and the nodal 
price or congestion. 
 
In some markets in North America, price bids are automatically screened, and the impact 
of each bid on the market price is calculated.  Where this is found to be unacceptable, the 
bid may be automatically mitigated to the level of a reference price. 
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4.2.4 Market Performance 
 
There are some indicators of market performance that are easily collected.  Others require 
complicated calculations.   
 
 Liquidity Measures 
 The number of suppliers in short term and long term markets, and in 
particular the number of traders who do not have physical positions in the 
market, can indicate the level of confidence held in the market, and affects 
how easily a market participant can find a counter-party for a trade. 
 The volume of trade in a market, relative to the underlying physical 
demand, is another useful measure of liquidity  
 
 Spot Market Exposure 
Research on forward markets, and the experience in California, teaches us that undue 
reliance on electricity spot markets is likely to lead to bad results.  We can measure 
this by monitoring: 
 The percent of load that is bought in under long term forward contracts. 
 The percent of load that is supplied by insufficiently unbundled companies 
with no use of market mechanisms 
 
 Competitive Price Benchmark Analysis 
Using a suitable model, it is possible to compute a competitive price benchmark.  This 
can then be used to obtain a derived Lerner Index. 
 The absolute level of this index can be an indicator of problems 
 Comparisons can be made over time, and with other markets 
 
 Net Revenue Analysis 
This analysis is used to compare revenues with estimates of costs on a medium-
term basis, typically taking a year at a time.  Comparisons can be made between 
revenues and: 
 Entry costs (the full annualized costs of a new plant) 
 Exit costs (the costs that could be avoided if a plant was to shut down for a 
year) 
 The cost of transmission alternatives to generation. 
 
These comparisons can be made for plant operating at a range of load factors, 
such as base load, intermediate and peaking plants. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the market monitoring indices used in practice. 
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Table 4 - Summary of Market Monitoring Indices used in Practice17
                                          Category Frequency Implementation Data Required 
Market Prices and 
System Conditions 
    
Price Trends Close-to-real time,   ex-post 
Hourly, daily, 
monthly Straightforward 
Spot, forward & fuel 
prices 
Price Comparisons Close-to-real time,   ex-post 
Hourly, daily, 
monthly Straightforward 
Spot, forward & fuel 
prices 
Price Setting Analysis Ex-post Daily, monthly Straightforward Spot, forward & fuel prices 
Demand and Capacity 
Comparisons Ex-post Daily, monthly Straightforward 
Demand data, 
generation capacity and 
generation offered 
Congestion Analysis Ex-post Daily, monthly Considerable  effort required 
Transmission 
constraints data, Nodal 
prices or constrained 
on/off payments 
Market Structure     
Market Share Usually ex-ante Daily, monthly, annually 
Straightforward but 
requires defining 
appropriate zone 
Generator capacity or 
sales. Possibly 
transmission constraint 
data 
HHI Usually ex-ante  Daily, monthly, annually 
Straightforward but 
requires defining 
appropriate zone 
Generator capacity or 
sales. Possibly 
transmission constraint 
data 
Demand Responsiveness Close to real time, ex- post Monthly, annually Straightforward Demand data 
Pivotal Supplier Analysis Ex ante, close to real time, ex-post Hourly, daily 
Straightforward but 
requires defining 
appropriate zone 
Demand data and 
generator capacity. 
Possibly transmission 
constraint data 
Residual Supply Index Ex ante, close to real time, ex-post Hourly, daily 
Straightforward but 
requires defining 
appropriate zone 
Demand data and 
generator capacity. 
Possibly transmission 
constraint data 
Supplier Indices     
    Lerner Index  Exa-ante, close-to-real time,   ex-post Daily, monthly 
Moderate effort in using 
cost data and congestion 
data. 
Bid data. Possibly 
Marginal Cost data. 
    Bid Correlation Analysis Close-to-real time,   ex-post Daily, monthly 
Moderate effort if using 
cost data and congestion 
data 
Bid data. Possibly 
demand & congestion 
data 
    Load Factor Analysis Close-to-real time,   ex-post Daily, monthly Straightforward 
Output and capacity 
data 
    Outage Analysis Ex-post Monthly, annually Moderate effort required 
Outage data. Possibly 
demand, cost & price 
data. 
Market Performance     
    Liquidity Measures Close-to-real time, ex post Daily, monthly Straightforward Bid prices and volumes 
    Spot Market Exposure Close-to-real time, ex post Daily, monthly Straightforward Bid prices and volumes 
    Competitive Benchmark 
Analysis Ex-post Monthly, annually 
Considerable effort in 
model development 
Marginal costs, market 
prices 
    Net Revenue Analysis Ex post Annually Considerable effort in model development 
Capital and operating 
costs, technological data 
     Simulation Models Ex-ante Periodic studies Considerable effort in model development 
Cost data, demand 
elasticities, transmission 
constraints 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Inspired by a similarly framed table in NE-ISO (2002) 
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4.3 Powers of Market Monitoring Divisions 
 
The title “market monitoring division” implies the role of an observer, rather than of an 
enforcer.  Many market monitors are established within commercial organizations, rather 
than within governments, and it would be inappropriate to give them any kind of judicial 
powers over other market participants.  This means that when the monitor believes that a 
company has behaved in an inappropriate way, the monitor will generally need to report 
the behaviour to a regulator or to the competition authorities, rather than taking action 
itself.   
 
There are exceptions to this.  Some US markets involve automatic bid mitigation in 
particular circumstances.  A bid may be mitigated if it has a significant impact on the 
market price, and if the bid is above the reference level for the unit – typically, the 
reference level is based on its past bids.  Both the price impact that can trigger mitigation, 
and the reference bid, need to be tightly defined in the market rules, of course.  The 
market monitoring unit (or rather the market operator, given the tight timescales 
observed) will check bids for possible automatic mitigation.  This could be an automatic 
check of all bids (which would be resource-intensive) or it could be a response to 
“exceptional” prices coming out of the initial market solution.  If a bid meets the category 
for automatic mitigation, it is replaced with the reference bid and the market software is 
re-run. 
 
A second automatic approach, also commonly used in the US, is to have price caps in 
some or all markets.  This does not require action on the part of the market monitor, for 
the price cap is generally hard-wired into the market algorithms, so that a price exceeding 
the cap should never be produced.  The market monitor, however, should note the number 
of times that the price is at the cap, as this is likely to be an indicator of problems in the 
market, whether insufficient capacity, market power, or inappropriate rules. 
 
Apart from this, the powers of market monitors are generally limited to investigation and 
report.  This does not mean that the market monitor has no influence, however.  In PJM in 
the US, for example, the monitor will investigate behaviour that it believes could be an 
abuse of market power.  Since that market is generally competitive, the abuses that do 
occur tend to involve complex strategies to take advantage of the details of the market 
rules, or to exploit congestion to raise prices in the generator’s locality.  As the 
investigation proceeds, the market monitoring unit will write to the generator responsible, 
to alert it to the investigation and ask for information about (and possible justification of) 
its conduct.  From the point of view of the market monitoring unit, this letter is 
confidential.  From the point of view of the company receiving the letter, however, it is a 
warning that the company could find itself in trouble with the competition authorities in a 
few months’ time.  The company is likely to release the letter, since non-disclosure could 
be illegal under Securities legislation in the US.  The publicity is likely to stop the 
company from continuing with its actions, unless it is very confident that it can in fact 
 49
justify them.  In fact, the threat of publicity may be sufficient to prevent some attempts to 
exploit market power, without needing the backstop of legal action. 
 
In other cases, such ‘sunshine’ regulation will be insufficient, and companies will only be 
dissuaded from exploiting their market power if they know that they run the risk of 
substantial legal penalties.  These cannot be imposed by a market monitor inside a 
commercial organisation, and depend upon an efficient relationship between the market 
monitor and the regulator or the competition authorities.  The details of that relationship 
are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
5.  The Roles of Market Participants in Effective Market Monitoring 
 
Having examined the techniques available to detect market power, including the types of 
data that are required for such indices and analysis, we are now in a position to discuss 
the role of the various market participants in the process of effective market monitoring.  
 
The data of interest for market monitoring has been summarized in table 4 and consists of 
both physical flows and financial transactions and prices.  In high-level terms, data is held 
by the following agents:  
 
 TSO/ISO  
 Physical flow patterns 
 Bids to balancing markets 
 Bids in pools (if run by ISO) 
 
 Transmission right auctioneer (if independent of TSO/ISO) 
 Bids, market clearing prices and allocation of transmission rights 
 
 Power Exchanges 
 Bids, market clearing price and allocation for spot market and forward 
contracts of transactions through the power exchange. 
 If there is a pool setting then all day-ahead transactions can be traced. 
However, most pools (e.g. PJM) allow bilateral transactions and only 
require nomination of the flows. For such transactions price information is 
not available to or at the pool. 
 
 Brokers, market makers 
 Information on bilateral contracts brokered 
 
 Market participants 
 Information on directly negotiated bilateral contracts 
 
 Generators 
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 Information of costs, derating, outages and capacities. 
 
The following figure shows that data is increasingly centrally located, the closer the 
interaction occurs to dispatch. This is caused by the increasing level of centralised 
coordination and liquidity required in the shorter time frame.  
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Figure 1: Source of data on market interactions 
 
This also explains why most market monitoring focuses on day-ahead markets, rather 
than long-term markets - more data is available. 
 
The economic argument for focusing on the spot or day-ahead market has already been 
briefly mentioned in section 2.  A functioning and competitive day-ahead market provides 
information and a default alternative to long-term contracting.  This reduces (but does not 
eliminate) the ability of generators to exercise market power on long-term contracts and 
should relieve the monitor from evaluating the prices in long-term contracts. On the other 
hand, the incentive to manipulate the spot and other markets depends on the extent to 
which market participants are contracted, and so this information is relevant for market 
surveillance. 
 
While it is difficult to obtain data on bilateral contracts, some monitoring of these markets 
seems important. Some of this data may be held by centralised power exchanges. These 
exchanges face an apparent dilemma – they need to assure market participants that they 
provide a fair and unbiased platform, and therefore have an incentive to monitor the 
market, independently of outside requirements. But at the same time they might worry 
that large market players will be reluctant  to trade on voluntary exchanges if their actions 
are visible to competitors. While power exchanges might be reluctant to grant 
competition authorities access to all their information (for fear that it might be disclosed 
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to their competitors), they may already fall under financial service control, like the 
Financial Service Authority (FSA) in the UK. In June 2004 UKPX changed its status 
from a recognized investment exchange to an alternative trading system. It now conducts 
itself as if it were a broker, but still has the principal duties as an exchange, including 
market monitoring, financial surveillance and investigations. In France, Powernext SA is 
overseen both by CRE (the Energy Regulator) and the Authorité des Marches Financiers, 
the regulator in charge of monitoring France’s financial markets. Powernext SA has the 
responsibility to conduct market surveillance and compliance activities.  
 
The very nature of a TSO/ISO requires that all physical transactions have to be reported 
to this institution, so that it is well-placed to hold a complete, centrally stored record.  As 
such it is the logical prime source of information on market evolution. It would be 
difficult to get an adequate picture of the total production volumes of different players 
from other sources, given that most power exchanges only handle a small fraction of total 
production. This quantity data provides valuable information for understanding both the 
incentives for the behaviour of market participants and also their final actions, and is 
essential to the proper investigation of market behaviour. As the market participants are 
already obliged to report to the TSO this creates no additional burdens on market 
participants and the TSO (except perhaps changes in IT systems to ensure compatibility 
between TSOs). 
 
TSOs might argue that their working relationship with generation companies might suffer 
if they suspect that the TSO passes on excessive amounts of information to regulatory 
authorities. This concern can be best dealt with by clearly specifying the information 
requirements and demonstrating that it is no greater than that required in many other 
markets (particularly those in the US). Some parties voice concerns that confidentiality 
requirements of their customers could be infringed. The natural solution is to agree which 
information is to remain confidential to the authorities and how any data to be published 
may be delayed, aggregated or anonymised to protect justifiable commercial 
confidentiality. The Dutch TSO, TenneT, provides a good example of the timely 
publication of availability and other market relevant data (see e.g. 
http://www.tennet.nl/english/other/ where availability data is published pursuant to 
Article 2.5 of the Netherlands System Code). 
 
There are a number of further aspects that should be considered when deciding on an 
appropriate strategy to deal with the data: 
 
 The information should be stored for sufficient time to allow ex-post investigation 
of various events. 
 The data should ideally be stored in a homogeneous format all over Europe. Such 
requirements reduce the cost of analysis and also increase the integrity of data. At 
the very least the format should be agreed with the regulator so that it cannot be 
adjusted to make market power more difficult to detect. 
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 Access rights to the data should be clearly specified. In some countries many data 
requests are routinely rejected on grounds of confidentiality of client-specific data 
(such as individual plant outputs). This does not appear to be a problem in the US 
and the UK. 
 As much of the data as possible should be made publicly available, possibly with 
some time delay (to allay concerns over tacit collusion and confidentiality). A 
search of the web-sites of European TSOs revealed that there is currently limited 
data available online. Such data would facilitate academic and third party 
research, which can offer a cheap addition to market analysis and provides a check 
on and hence a disincentive to regulatory capture. 
 Regulatory authorities should receive access to the data either automatically or on 
request, without the need for legal proceedings. In some countries (such as The 
Netherlands) the original Electricity Law may fail to specify that the regulatory 
authority has the power to demand information on a regular basis (as opposed to 
as part of a formal investigation), and this may require legislative correction or 
clarification. License conditions are a straightforward way of imposing such 
disclosure conditions, and can usually be changed by agreement or reference to 
the competition authorities, but not all countries require generators to hold 
licences.  
 In some countries significant fractions of generation capacity are connected to the 
distribution network. This may require that the system operator of the distribution 
network reports similar information as the TSO for monitoring purposes.  
 Where bilateral contracts are reported to TSOs, particularly contracts 
corresponding to international transactions, they have a high value for market 
monitoring purposes and should also be provided. 
 The market monitoring function should be clearly separated from the regulation of 
the transmission network. This becomes more important as incentive mechanisms 
become more complex and are based on the performance of the network. In such 
cases the TSO might become more reluctant to share information with the 
regulation authority that sets the revenue cap. It may be desirable to institutionally 
separate the market monitoring activities from the transmission regulator. 
 
The analysis of generator behaviour and network use requires experts familiar with the 
particular network and generation park of the kind that TSOs are best placed to provide. 
This suggests the need for close cooperation between the monitoring unit and the TSO. 
The level of TSO expertise required is likely to depend on the accuracy expected from the 
analysis. 
 
The previous sections showed that some interpretation of data can be automated, but more 
complex patterns of exercise of market power can only be identified with a carefully 
tailored analysis. If these analyses are to command credibility they will have to be 
conducted by a market monitor independent of those potentially exercising market power. 
In the case studies presented in the appendix, market monitors are closely linked to the 
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ISO.   The independence condition is satisfied in these cases because the ISO is 
independent of interests in generation or demand. In some European countries the TSO is 
financially linked with large generation or distribution companies and except in the case 
of very special governance rules for the TSO company under tight regulatory control, it is 
therefore constrained towards market monitoring. In such cases the monitoring function 
will need to be located in the regulatory office (or as an independent body), and many of 
the potential benefits of drawing on the TSO expertise will be lost. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
There is a growing consensus that the market monitoring process is an essential part of a 
well functioning electricity market. There are sound theoretical reasons (and supporting 
evidence) for suspecting that electricity markets may be unusually susceptible at times to 
the exercise of market power, compared to other markets. The peculiar features of the 
electricity supply industry make normal antitrust or competition law an inadequate base 
for addressing issues of market power and constitute the main argument for market 
monitoring.  In some markets, the monitor can mitigate some kinds of abusive behaviour 
automatically, but the presence of an adequately resourced market monitor should act as a 
deterrent to the exercise of market power. Resources here include both information and 
analytic capabilities. 
 
Transmission operators are well-placed to provide the main data required for market 
monitoring, given their access to much of the data required. They also have the expertise 
to analyse that data and support it from their understanding of the behaviour of generating 
companies. That suggests that where they are truly independent of other market 
participants, they may provide a home for a market monitoring unit. Even in such cases, 
there is considerable merit in having an independently appointed Board of experts 
(perhaps 2-3) who can call for additional information and analysis, and which can 
impartially comment on the actions of the TSO, thus reassuring market participants of the 
impartiality of the analysis. This approach has worked with reasonable success so far in 
the United States and other non-European electricity markets. In Europe, the cooperation 
between Eltra and the Nordic Competition Authorities in the development of the MARS 
model of the Nord Pool area, which has been applied to analysing the market power of 
dominant generators, provides a good example of the potentially beneficial involvement 
of a TSO in the market monitoring process. Where unbundling between TSOs and 
generation is not sufficient, it is clearly more difficult to assure complete impartiality, and 
any market monitoring unit that depends on information and analysis from the TSO will 
need a carefully designed oversight and governance structure if it is to maintain a 
reputation for effective and impartial market surveillance. 
 
In this paper, we discuss the techniques used by economists to identify the potential for, 
and exercise of, market power in electricity wholesale markets.  A wide range of 
techniques have been proposed and adopted. Simpler measures have their drawbacks, and 
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more complex techniques have yet to prove that they are necessary to justify their 
considerable additional resource requirements, but progress over the past few years in 
defining best practice has been impressive, if not conclusive.  
 
Network congestion potentially provides a number of opportunities for the exercise of 
market power.  It is therefore important that congestion is monitored and taken into 
account in market power monitoring in practice.  TSOs clearly have a central role to play 
in this regard.  Our survey revealed relatively little empirical work published relating 
directly to transmission-related means of exercising market power.  This is perhaps 
surprising given that, for example in Europe, transmission constraints are responsible for 
creating market power by effectively fragmenting markets.  It will be particularly 
important to consider the market power implications of new proposals for cross-border 
access and congestion management in the European market.  The TSOs have to allocate 
transmission capacity for commercial national and international transactions and for 
system security purposes. Given the large implications of small changes of available 
transmission capacity on local prices and the exercise of market power, a credible and 
transparent process has to be developed to guide these decisions. To assist in this process, 
system and flow patterns need to be stored for verification. 
 
Our investigation suggests three key lessons.  First, it is desirable to employ a range of 
techniques, and market monitors should be open to new evidence of their success and 
weaknesses.  Second, there should be a presumption in favour of retaining data, so that it 
is available for any tests that may be developed or adopted in future.  Third, as much data 
as possible should be published, to allow independent analysts to refine techniques for the 
detection, and hence the deterrence, of market power.  Politically sustainable electricity 
markets require market participants, consumers and politicians to have confidence that 
market abuse will be detected and deterred, and ensuring market sustainability is 
therefore in the interest of all participants. 
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Appendix A   Case Studies 
 
New York 
 
Market Overview18
 
New York State has a population of around 19 million people. Annual demand is 
approximately 150 TWh, and peak load is about 30,000 MW. The fuel mix is 2001 was: 
Gas 29%, Nuclear 28%, Coal 16%, Hydro 16%, Oil 10% and other 1%. 
 
In November 1999, the former NY Power Pool, which had been established in the 1960s, 
became the New York Independent System Operation (NYISO).  The wholesale market it 
operates is an integrated market with day-ahead, hour ahead and real-time energy 
markets. Energy transactions and transmission usage scheduled in each of these markets 
are settled using Locational Based Marginal Prices (LBMPs). The pool is not compulsory 
and bilateral trade outside the pool is allowed. Load serving entities are required to 
contract for capacity at load plus an 18% reserve margin.  
 
Market Monitoring 
 
Market monitoring is performed by the Market Monitoring and Performance Division, a 
division of the NYISO.  The division is composed of approximately 28 staff and is 
divided into four units: Mitigation and Compliance, Analysis, Investigation, and Data 
Services. 
 
The NYISO has explicit market mitigation authority. The Mitigation and Compliance unit 
performs day-to-day monitoring, checking for compliance and mitigating behavior as 
necessary and authorized, including administering the Automated Mitigation Procedure 
(AMP).  The Analysis unit focuses on long-range issues, including analysis of market 
performance and design issues. The Investigation unit performs investigations, including 
physical audits of facilities, which are kept confidential, and formal investigations into 
irregular or potentially non-competitive behavior. The Data Services unit supports the 
data needs of the other groups. 
 
Under the NYISO Market Monitoring Plan, the MMU reports to the CEO of the NYISO, 
who is in turn responsible to the ISO board for monitoring activities. The MMU also 
works closely with a board-appointed independent Market Advisor who takes an active 
role in market monitoring activities. The Market Advisor aids in setting market 
monitoring and mitigation procedures, provides an independent assessment of the ISO 
                                                 
18 The market overviews in the appendix have partly drawn upon Zhou (2003) and Grimston (2004). The 
market monitoring sections have partly drawn upon Goldman et al. (2004) and Synapse (2001) 
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and the MMU itself, and prepares the yearly market report. The independent Market 
Advisor reports directly to the ISO board (Goldman, 2004). 
 
The following data or information may be obtained by the NYISO from Market Parties in 
accordance with the Market Monitoring Plan. Market parties shall retain the following 
categories of data or information for at least two years, or such other period specified in 
any applicable data or information retention policy issued by the NYISO. 
 
1. Production costs - Data or information relating to the costs of operating a 
specified Electric Facility (for generating units such data or information shall 
include, but not be limited to, heat rates, start-up fuel requirements, fuel purchase 
costs, and operating and maintenance expenses). 
 
2. Opportunity costs - Data or information relating to a claim of relatively high 
opportunity costs, including, but not limited to, contracts or price quotes. 
 
3. Logs - Data or information relating to the operating status of an Electric 
Facility, including, for generating units, generator logs showing the generating 
status of a specified unit. Such data or information shall include, but not be limited 
to, any information relating to the validity of a claimed forced outage or derating 
of a generating unit or other Electric Facility. 
 
4. Bidding Agreements - Data or information relating to the ability of a Market 
Party or its Affiliate to determine the pricing or output level of generating capacity 
owned by another entity, including but not limited to any document setting forth 
the terms or conditions the ability of the Market Party or its Affiliate to make such 
determinations.  
 
Data and Indices Monitored 
 
The following data, indices and screens are monitored to identify potential problems with 
the market rules or potential market power concerns that need to be investigated further or 
warrant immediate mitigation. 
 
A. Energy Market 
 
1. Day-ahead energy market bids/bilateral schedules 
(a) Variable component (including incremental/decremental bids from bilaterals). 
(b) Start-up cost component and other commitment parameters (hours off-line, 
minimum run-time, minimum down-time, notification, max stops). 
(c) Other generator specifications (e.g., changes to maximum operating limits, 
minimum generation, response rates, penalty and power factors). 
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(d) Percent of the total unit Dependable Maximum Net Capability (DMNC) and/or 
Seasonal Maximum Operating Limit that was bid or scheduled in the day-
ahead market. 
(e) Total day-ahead energy bids. 
(f) Total amount of energy scheduled bilaterally. 
(g) Day-ahead ISO forecast of hourly total load. 
(h) Day-ahead participants’ forecast of hourly total load. 
(i) Day-ahead total load bid by participant. 
(j) Day-ahead total of load bids for the market. 
 
2. Hour-ahead energy market bids 
(a) Variable component (including incremental/decremental bids from bilaterals). 
(b) Percent of the total unit DMNC and/or Seasonal Maximum Operating Limit 
that was bid or scheduled in the hour-ahead market. 
 
3. Location-Based Marginal Prices 
(a) Day-ahead LBMP at each bus. 
(b) Hour-ahead LBMP at each bus. 
(c) Real-Time (five minute) LBMP at each bus. 
(d) Day-ahead price for each load zone. 
(e) Real-time price for each load zone. 
 
4. Transmission System Congestion 
(a) Total system-wide congestion (total congestion revenue collected by the ISO). 
(b) Congestion component of each day-ahead bus LBMP. 
(c) Congestion component of each real-time bus LBMP. 
(d) Scheduled net import and exports between zones or areas within New York. 
(e) Actual net import and exports between zones or areas within New York. 
 
5. Dispatch and load levels 
(a) Hourly dispatch level for each unit. 
(b) Hourly total dispatch level by owner. 
(c) Hourly total dispatch level for the NY market. 
(d) Hourly load by LSE 
 (e) Hourly total market load. 
(f) Unit dispatch deviations from ISO signal. 
 
B. Ancillary Service Markets 
 
1. Spinning reserve market 
(a) Day-ahead availability bid (MW, $/MW). 
(b) Hour-ahead availability bid (MW, $/MW). 
(c) Day-ahead Market clearing spinning reserve price. 
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(d) Real-time Market clearing spinning reserve price. 
(e) Amount of spinning reserve traded at day-ahead prices. 
(f) Amount of spinning reserve traded at real-time prices. 
 
2. 10 Minute non-spinning reserve market 
(a) Day-ahead availability bid (MW, $/MW). 
(b) Hour-ahead availability bid (MW, $/MW). 
(c) Day-ahead Market clearing 10 minute non-spinning reserve price. 
(d) Real-time Market clearing 10 minute non-spinning reserve price. 
(e) Amount of 10 minute non-spinning reserve traded at day-ahead prices. 
(f) Amount of 10 minute non-spinning reserve traded at real-time prices. 
 
3. 30 Minute non-spinning reserve market 
(a) Day-ahead availability bid (MW, $/MW). 
(b) Hour-ahead availability bid (MW, $/MW) 
(c) Day-ahead Market clearing 30 minute non-spinning reserve price. 
(d) Real-time Market clearing 30 minute non-spinning reserve price. 
(e) Amount of 30 minute non-spinning reserve traded at day-ahead prices. 
(f) Amount of 30 minute non-spinning reserve traded at real-time prices. 
 
4. Regulation service 
(a) Day-ahead availability bid (MW, $/MW). 
(b) Market clearing regulation price. 
 
5. Supplemental resource bids 
 
C. Installed Capacity (ICAP) Market 
1. Total ICAP Responsibilities. 
2. Total resources capable of providing ICAP. 
3. ICAP Responsibilities by LSE. 
4. Subtotals of ICAP capable resources by owner. 
5. Amount of ICAP sold or offered by each owner. 
6. ICAP clearing price. 
 
D. System Conditions 
1. Transmission facility planned outages. 
2. Transmission facility forced outages. 
3. Generating unit planned outages. 
4. Generating unit forced outages. 
5. When congestion is present. 
(a) Limiting transmission element. 
(b) Nature of constraint (thermal, voltage, stability). 
(c) Top ten contributors to constraint. 
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E. Adjacent Markets 
1. Energy prices in PJM, ECAR, NEPOOL and Canada. 
2. Hourly loads in PJM, ECAR, NEPOOL and Canada. 
3. Hourly interchange with PJM, ECAR, NEPOOL and Canada. 
4. Ancillary service prices in PJM, ECAR, NEPOOL and Canada. 
5. ICAP prices in PJM, ECAR, NEPOOL and Canada. 
 
F. Fuel Prices 
1. Natural Gas 
(a) Spot prices. 
(b) Futures contracts. 
2. Oil 
(a) Spot prices. 
(b) Futures prices. 
3. Coal 
(a) Spot prices. 
(b) Futures prices. 
 
Indices and Screens  
 
A. Bid Reference Prices 
•  The lower of the mean or the median of the unit’s bids over the previous 90 
days for similar hours or load levels, adjusted for changes in fuel prices. 
•  The mean of the LBMP at the unit’s location during the lowest-priced 25 
percent of hours that the unit was dispatched over the previous 90 days, adjusted 
for changes in fuel prices. 
•  The mean of the bids supplied by all units of similar types. 
 
1. Day-ahead energy bid reference prices 
(a) variable component. 
(b) start-up cost component. 
 
2. Real-time energy market reference prices - variable component of hour-ahead bid 
 
3. Spinning reserve market reference prices 
(a) day-ahead availability bid. 
(b) hour-ahead availability bid. 
 
4. 10 Minute non-spinning reserve market reference prices 
(a) day-ahead availability bid. 
(b) hour-ahead availability bid 
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5. 30 Minute non-spinning reserve market reference prices 
(a) day-ahead availability bid. 
(b) hour-ahead availability bid. 
 
6. Regulation service reference prices 
 
B. Bid variation 
 
1. Deviation of bids from reference price levels 
(a) Deviation of day ahead energy market bids. 
(b) Deviation of hour-ahead energy market bids. 
(c) Deviation of spinning reserve market bids. 
(d) Deviation of 10 Minute non-spinning reserve market bids. 
(e) Deviation of 30 Minute non-spinning reserve market bids. 
(f) Deviation of regulation service bids. 
 
2. Deviation of bids from longer or shorter-term moving averages of prior bids 
(a) Deviation of day ahead energy market bids. 
(b) Deviation of hour-ahead energy market bids. 
(c) Deviation of spinning reserve market bids. 
(d) Deviation of 10 Minute non-spinning reserve market bids. 
(e) Deviation of 30 Minute non-spinning reserve market bids. 
(f) Deviation of regulation service bids. 
 
C. Scheduling variation 
 
1. Deviation of day-ahead prices from day-ahead reference price levels when a generator 
is not scheduled or its schedule is reduced 
(a) Deviation of day-ahead LBMPs from day-ahead energy reference prices 
(b) Deviation of day-ahead spinning reserve price from day-ahead spinning 
reserve reference price. 
(c) Deviation of day-ahead 10-minute non-spinning reserve price from day-ahead 
10-minute non-spinning reserve reference price. 
(d) Deviation of day-ahead 30-minute non-spinning reserve price from day-ahead 
30-minute non-spinning reserve reference price. 
 
2. Deviation of real-time prices from real-time reference price levels when a generator is 
not scheduled or its schedule is reduced 
(a) Deviation of real-time LBMPs from real-time energy reference prices. 
(b) Deviation of real-time spinning reserve price from real-time spinning reserve 
reference price. 
(c) Deviation of real-time 10-minute non-spinning reserve price from real-time 
10-minute non-spinning reserve reference price. 
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(d) Deviation of real-time 30-minute non-spinning reserve price from real-time 
30- minute non-spinning reserve reference price. 
(e) Deviation of current regulation service market price from regulation service 
reference price. 
 
3. Deviation between an LSE’s actual load served real-time and the bid amount in the 
dayahead market. 
 
4. Deviation between an LSE’s actual load served real-time and the load dispatched in the 
day-ahead market. 
 
5. Deviation between the total market load served real-time and the total bid amount in 
the day-ahead market. 
 
6. Deviation between the total market load served real-time and the total load dispatched 
in the day-ahead market. 
 
D. Bid and Schedule Correlations 
1. Correlation of unit schedules or bids and the existence or magnitude of congestion. 
2. Correlation of unit schedules or bids and generator bus LBMPs. 
3. Correlation of total system load in New York and LBMPs. 
4. Correlation of generator forced outages and LBMPs or congestion. 
5. Correlation of transmission facility forced outages and LBMPs or congestion. 
 
E. Residual Demand Indices – percent of market demand that must be served by a 
specific supplier (assuming all other suppliers are selling at their maximum capability) 
• An RDI of 10 percent indicates that the supplier is effectively a monopoly 
supplier over 10 percent of the demand. 
• Negative RDI values indicate that the supplier faces no residual demand over 
which it would effectively be a monopoly. 
 
1. Energy Market 
(a) Hourly market 
(b) Day-ahead market 
2. Ancillary Service Markets 
3. ICAP Market 
 
F. Price Deviations 
 
1. Hourly difference between the real-time and day-ahead price. 
2. Average difference between the real-time and day-ahead price over a specified 
period (i.e., initially a rolling eight week period). 
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3. Hourly difference in prices between New York and adjacent regions at the 
interconnection locations.
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Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) 
 
Overview of Market 
 
The Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) Interconnection is the oldest power pool 
in the United Stated, established in 1927.  It serves a population of more than about 35 
million customers with an installed capacity of 106,000 MW and peak demand of 87,000 
MW.  In the year 2000, PJM served 446 million GWh of energy, which represents about 
10% of U.S. electric energy.  PJM’s power is generated from a fuel mix of 49% coal, 
37% nuclear, 8% gas, 3% oil, and 3% hydroelectric. 
 
In 1998 PJM became an independent system operator and now operates a day-ahead 
energy market, a real-time energy market, a daily capacity market, monthly and multi-
monthly capacity markets, a regulation market, and the monthly Financial Transmission 
Rights (FTRs) auction market. The power pool operated by the ISO is not a compulsory 
one, allowing for outside bilateral trading. PJM introduced nodal energy pricing with 
market-clearing prices in April 1998 and nodal market-clearing prices based on 
competitive offers in April 1999. PJM implemented a competitive auction-based FTR 
market in May 1999.  Daily capacity markets were introduced in January 1999 and were 
broadened to include monthly and multi-monthly markets in mid-1999.  PJM 
implemented the day-ahead energy market and the regulation market in June 2000. 
 
Market Monitoring 
 
As with all the US ISOs, PJM has established a Market Monitoring Unit (MMU). The 
PJM MMU has a staff of twelve and an external designated market advisor. The MMU is 
administratively under the President of PJM, but the manager has the authority to 
independently contact the PJM board and FERC. 
 
The objectives of PJM market monitoring unit are delineated in the Market Monitoring 
Plan, as approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).   The 
objectives of PJM’s MMU are to monitor and report on issues relating to the operation of 
the PJM Market. These include the evaluation of the operation of both pool and bilateral 
markets to detect either design flaws in the PJM Market operating rules or to detect 
structural problems in the PJM Market, to evaluate any required enforcement mechanisms 
to ensure compliance with pool rules and to ensure that the monitoring program will be 
conducted in an independent and objective manner. In particular, the PJM Market 
Monitoring Plan states that the MMU shall be responsible for monitoring compliance 
with the PJM market rules, actual or potential design flaws in PJM market rules and the 
potential of any market participant(s) to exercise undue market power.  
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The MMU does not have sanctioning or mitigation authority apart from imposing cost-
based offer caps on must run units. 
 
Data and Indices Monitored 
1.1. PJM system prices and loads. 
1.1.1. Average PJM load weighted price; 
1.1.2. Maximum PJM load weighted price; 
1.1.3. Average PJM load; 
1.1.4. Maximum PJM load; 
1.1.5. Correlations between PJM prices and loads. 
1.2. PJM congestion. 
1.2.1. Maximum hourly congestion costs; 
1.2.2. Total congestion cost; 
1.2.3. Number of active constraints. 
1.3. PJM volumes. 
1.3.1. Total MW bid; 
1.3.2. Total MW self scheduled; 
1.3.3. Total bilateral contract MW; 
1.3.4. Hourly net imports and exports including all components. 
1.4. Comparative prices and loads for PJM and surrounding power markets: 
1.4.1. Prices for each system; 
1.4.2. Loads for each system; 
1.4.3. Net imports/exports between PJM and each system. 
 
2. Locational prices and loads. 
2.1. Bus locational marginal prices (LMPs); 
2.2. Aggregate bus LMPs; 
2.3. Bus LMPs less the PJM average price; 
2.4. Loads and generation by bus; 
2.5. The distribution of LMP rankings for each bus by bus price and by bus 
load/generation; 
2.6. Daily/weekly/monthly price-load comparisons: 
2.6.1. Maximum bus LMP by hour; 
2.6.2. Minimum bus LMP by hour; 
2.6.3. Average load LMP by zone, by aggregate load bus, for PJM; 
2.6.4. Average generation LMP by zone, by aggregate load bus, for PJM; 
2.6.5. Load/injections by bus, by zone, by aggregate buses, for PJM. 
2.7. Zonal prices 
2.7.1. Zonal daily price 
2.7.2. Highest bus price within zone; 
2.7.3. Price ranking across zones. 
 
3. Congestion by hour/day/week/month/year by bus/zone/bus aggregates. 
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3.1. Total congestion costs for period; 
3.2. Peak congestion costs; 
3.3. Percent of time with congestion; 
3.4. Frequency of constraint; 
3.5. Frequency of must run price cap implementation; 
3.6. Frequency of constraints without must run price cap implementation. 
 
4. Offers and dispatch. 
4.1. Unit offer/supply curves; 
4.2. Company aggregate offer/supply curves; 
4.3. Aggregate PJM supply curves; 
4.4. Comparisons of unit offer/supply curves to historical offer curves; 
4.5. Comparisons of company offer/supply curves to historical supply curves; 
4.6. Comparisons of aggregate PJM supply curves to historical supply curves; 
4.7. Identification of units which set price; 
4.8. Frequency of individual units setting price; 
4.9. Deviations from requested dispatch, by unit; 
4.10. Ramp rates by unit, by time period, by company. 
4.11. Comparisons of ramp rates by unit type, by company. 
4.12. Conditions on offers: start times; minimum run requirements; start costs. 
 
5. Available capacity 
5.1. Total capacity resources; 
5.2. Total available capacity; 
5.3. Outage status by unit; 
5.4. Frequency of outages, by type, by unit, by time period; 
5.5. Comparisons of outages across units; 
5.6. Company summary outage frequency; 
5.7. Comparisons of outages across companies; 
5.8. Frequency of unit outages by time period, by demand conditions; by 
system/bus price. 
 
6. Market Structure 
6.1. Concentration ratios by hour; 
6.2. Incremental concentration ratios by hour; 
6.3. Concentration ratios by transmission defined markets within PJM; 
6.4. Concentration ratios by zone; 
6.5. Concentration ratios by interface.  
 
7. Price-cost margins 
7.1. Unit specific price-cost margins; 
7.1.1. Compare unit offers to unit costs 
7.2. Company price-cost margins; 
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7.2.1. Compare unit price-cost margins by company. 
 
8. Capacity market 
8.1. Company supply curves by time period of market; 
8.2. Company demand curves by time period of market; 
8.3. Market prices for each market; 
8.4. Capacity position by company 
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New England ISO 
 
Market Overview 
 
The ISO New England (ISO-NE) was established as a non-profit, private corporation on 
July 1, 1997.   ISO-NE is responsible for operating New England’s electric bulk power 
system and for administering the region’s restructured wholesale electricity markets.  The 
six-state region the ISO serves includes Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont.  Made up of more than 350 generating units 
(installed capacity of 32,000 MW) connected by more than 8,000 miles of transmission 
lines, the ISO-NE serves more than 6.5 million New England customers.  ISO-NE 
experienced a record demand of 24,967 MW in Summer 2001. 
 
Participants can sell via bilateral trades, day ahead market or real time market. In the 
current New England market, 75 percent of the electricity trading is covered under 
bilateral contracts, while 25 percent is traded in the real-time market. There is locational 
marginal pricing. There are also financial transmission rights. 
 
Market Monitoring 
 
The ISO-NE Market Monitoring and Mitigation (MMM) group is comprised of a 
manager and 10 full time staff. About half of this team works on day-to-day mitigation, 
including data review and other short-term analysis, while the remaining staff is 
responsible for taking a broader view of long-term market issues, collaborating with the 
market design group, and offering feedback to other groups within the ISO. The MMM 
group suggests changes to market rules, evaluates proposed market rules, and proposes 
new monitoring procedures. The manager of the MMM group reports to the CEO and has 
authority to independently contact the ISO board and FERC directly, if needed (see ISO-
NE 2002). Occasionally, the MMM group also hires expert consultants to perform special 
analyses. 
 
Similar to NYISO, ISO-NE uses an Independent Market Advisor who assesses ISO 
markets and conducts independent studies as needed, often times at the request of the 
ISO-NE board. The Market Advisor tends to interact informally with the Market 
Monitoring and Mitigation group and reports directly to the ISO board. (Goldman, 2004) 
 
Unfortunately, ISO-NE has not published an official list of the data and indices that it 
follows. However, examination of their annual reports makes clear that they follow a 
wide range of data on various prices, demand (including demand responsiveness), 
capacity, and transmission market conditions.  The more advanced indices and analysis 
they report on include: 
 
 Market share analysis 
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 HHI – system and local areas 
 Residual supply index 
 Outages and Reductions vs. Demand Levels 
 Outage auditing 
 Competitive Benchmark Analysis 
 Net Revenue and Market Entry Analysis 
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California 
 
Market Overview 
California is the most populated State in the USA, with a population of about 27 million 
people.  The state has an installed capacity of approximately 55 GW.   In 2003, the 
generation mix comprised of gas 37%, coal 21%, hydro 16%, nuclear 15% and 
renewables 10%.  Imports comprise 22% of supply. In 2003 demand was 276,000 GWh. 
 
In its Market Design 2002 (MD02), CAISO proposes a three-settlement system, including 
a day-ahead market, an hour-ahead market, and a real-time market based on Locational 
Marginal Pricing (LMP). 
 
Market Monitoring 
 
Market monitoring is conducted by the Division of Market Analysis in CAISO and 
comprises of three groups: Market Monitoring, Market Analysis and Mitigation, and 
Market Investigations.  The Market Monitoring Division conducts the day-to-day 
monitoring, analysis and reporting. When this group uncovers unusual bids or potentially 
noncompetitive behavior, it turns over information to the Market Investigations group, 
which is responsible for investigating and reporting on the source of the unusual activity. 
Market Analysis and Mitigation primarily works on the design of market power 
mitigation measures and other market design issues related to market performance. 
 
The CAISO also has an independent advisory body, called the Market Surveillance 
Committee, which presently is composed of four experts from academia who perform 
studies and prepare reports on relevant market issues as requested by CAISO or others 
(e.g., FERC). 
 
The ISO Department of Market Analysis (DMA) has the task of developing, refining and 
maintaining a series of indices or indicators which may suggest the presence of market 
power or its exercise or of other behavior that may undermine the efficient working of 
these markets, or may result in uncompetitive market outcomes.  These indices or 
indicators are seen, at a minimum, as serving as a warning sign to trigger further inquiry 
as to whether there is in the circumstances a problem that requires corrective action. 
Hence, the DMA does not see these indices or indicators, in most cases, as definitive tests 
of the existence of or the exercise of market power, or of behavior that undermines the 
market’s efficient functioning, but rather as a means of identifying circumstances that 
justify further inquiry or action. 
 
The following is a sample list of indices that the DMA proposed in 2002 that were to be 
developed over time.  
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Data and Indices Monitored 
 
(1) The percentage of Settlement Periods in which a Market Participant has set, or 
has submitted bids close to, the Market Clearing Price in the Energy and Ancillary 
Service markets overall, and in relation to the following time periods or market 
conditions: 
a) when such Market Participant is: 
i. a net buyer of Energy and Ancillary Services, 
ii. a net seller of Energy and Ancillary Services; 
b) during on-peak hours and off-peak hours; 
c) in different time periods otherwise of relevance to the state of the 
markets; 
These indices will also be examined in relationship to other “vulnerable 
periods” and bidding strategies; 
 
(2) The relationships between the Market Clearing Prices in the various markets 
administered by the ISO, e.g., between the Imbalance Energy market and the 
Ancillary Services markets; 
 
(3) The record of Market Participants setting Market Clearing Prices in the context 
of the inter-market relationships as described in (2); 
 
(4) The percentage of Settlement Periods in which a Market Participant has set, or 
has submitted bids close to, the Market Clearing Price when such price falls into a 
particular segments of the market price curve, e.g., $20-30/MWh, and $30/MWh 
and above; 
 
(5) Other indices that monitor the efficacy and effects of market power mitigation 
measures. 
 
 Comparison and Evaluation of Specific Bidding Strategies of Market 
Participants 
(6) Correlation between bidding behavior of Market Participants and their 
establishing the Market Clearing Price at times when they are: 
i. net buyers of Energy and Ancillary Services, 
ii. net sellers of Energy and Ancillary Services; 
 
(7) Bidding and re-bidding strategies of Market Participants, especially those that 
frequently set Market Clearing Prices during iterations in the bidding cycles of 
each market, both within and between the markets administered by the ISO; 
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(8) Comparison of bidding strategies for the same Generation unit into the 
Ancillary Service and Imbalance Energy markets; 
 
(9) Comparison of Supply Bids of Generation units with similar technology/age 
characteristics; 
 
(10) Supply Bid and Generation Unit withdrawals and redeclarations during 
bidding cycles; 
 
(11) Correlation of changes to initial Supply Bids with Market Clearing Prices, 
e.g., to ascertain if re-declarations cause or lead to increases in such prices; 
 
(12) Comparison of bidding strategies for the same Generation Unit in relation to 
the following time periods or market conditions:  
a) when the Market Participant that owns the unit is a net seller or a net 
buyer of Energy or Ancillary Services;b) when congestion is or is not 
present; 
c) when a Reliability Must-Run Unit is called or not called; 
d) when “near Congestion” occurs. “Near Congestion” means the final 
scheduled power flow over an Inter-Zonal Interface is within a few 
percentage points of the Available Transmission Capacity, or when 
congestion would occur with the initial Preferred Schedules but is 
alleviated after re-bidding; 
 
(13) Comparison of bidding strategies of Market Participants in relation to their 
market share; 
 
(14) Relationships or correlations between the ability of Market Participants to set 
Market Clearing Prices or certain type of bidding behavior and periods or 
circumstances in which such Market Participants may have exclusive or restrictive 
access to data, e.g., as to costs or availability of Reliability Must- Run Units, or as 
to expected or actual outages of Generation Units or transmission facilities; and 
 
(15) Breakdowns of bids by price; to assist in the understanding of bidding 
patterns, at levels ranging from the entire bid stack to bids from an individual unit. 
 
 Indices of Market Concentration 
The ISO Market Monitoring Unit will use dynamic, geographic and product 
market specific indices based on actual market operation data as indicators of the 
competitive condition of the ISO markets. The indicators include, but may not be 
limited to: 
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(16) Indices of “price-to-cost markup” that measure the difference between the 
Market Clearing Price or other appropriate price indices and an estimate of the 
competitive price; 
 
(17) The “Residual Supply Index,” or ratio of reserve capacity to the volume of 
generation provided by the largest single supplier, indicating that supplier’s 
capacity to be pivotal and potentially to hold prices above competitive levels; 
 
(18) A measure of supply responsiveness, or the volume of additional power that 
would be supplied for a given increase in price; 
 
(19) Traditional measures of concentration which might include conventional HHI 
(Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) analysis; and 
 
(20) Other indices as proposed and used effectively by members of the Energy 
Intermarket Surveillance Group, an association of market monitoring units in 
North America and Australia. 
 
Indices have been developed for: 
i. each of the geographic markets or zones; 
ii. each of ISO product markets including Imbalance Energy and Ancillary 
Services markets; 
iii. each of the market conditions such as on-peak and off-peak periods, periods 
with Congestion and without Congestion, and periods with and without other 
constraints; 
 
 Outages and Other Indices 
(21) Generation Unit and transmission facility Outage indices in comparison with 
historical averages, with other similar units or facilities, and with other relevant 
standards such as bidding behavior; 
 
(22) New or unexpected occurrences of Congestion; and 
 
(23) Trend comparisons of Market Clearing Prices with fuel prices and other input 
prices. 
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Ontario 
 
Market Overview 
Ontario has a population of over 12 million. Generating capacity is about 30,000 
megawatts, and the system has dual seasonal peak demands of about 25,000 MW (25,500 
MW in 2002). The electricity fuel mix is nuclear 37%, coal 29%, Hydro 26%, gas 7%, 
other 1%. 
 
The Ontario Independent Electricity Market Operator (IMO) is a corporation without 
share capital, established by the Electricity Act, 1998 to direct the operations of the 
electricity transmission system, maintain the reliability of the IMO-controlled grid, and to 
establish and operate the IMO-administered markets, Ontario’s wholesale electricity 
markets.  The IMO opened its wholesale and retail markets in May 2002.  The wholesale 
market design allows trading in a central pool; however Market Participants also can 
purchase or sell energy through physical bilateral contracts. The wholesale market jointly 
optimizes energy and operating reserve to produce a province-wide market clearing price 
(MCP) every 5 minutes.  At present there is no day-ahead market nor is there locational 
marginal pricing, although both may be considered in the future. The IMO auctions 
financial transmission rights (FTRs) with which Market Participants can hedge the 
congestion charges between Ontario and each external zone. 
 
Market Monitoring 
 
The role of regulator falls in part to the IMO and in part to the Ontario Energy Board 
(OEB).  The IMO is tasked with monitoring, evaluating and analyzing the effectiveness 
of the market rules and underlying structure, as well as the conduct of market participants, 
to ensure the efficiency and competitiveness of the wholesale electricity market. This 
responsibility is led by Ontario’s Market Surveillance Panel (MSP), an independent arms-
length body appointed by and accountable to the Independent Directors of the IMO.  
 
The Market Surveillance Panel (MSP) monitors, investigates and reports on market 
behaviour in Ontario’s competitive electricity market. Its objective is to contribute to the 
development of an efficient, competitive and reliable wholesale market for electricity and 
ancillary services in Ontario. The Panel’s specific responsibilities include:  
 monitoring behaviour in the marketplace;  
 investigating and recommending on: 
¾ the behaviour of specific market participants, if they are suspected of 
gaming or abusing their market power 
¾ the design of the rules and operating procedures of the marketplace 
¾ the structure of the marketplace 
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¾ reporting on the results of its monitoring and investigations  
 
Should the MSP detect that a market participant has acted to take advantage of the rules 
or abuse its market power, the Panel will initiate investigations and make 
recommendations to the IMO, the Ontario Energy Board, the federal Competition Bureau 
or other government agencies as appropriate. These organizations, in turn, have the 
authority to penalize and influence conduct through penalties, rule changes, altered 
licence conditions, divestiture orders or criminal prosecutions. The IMO and the MSP 
have signed an agreement with the OEB and the Competition Bureau outlining each 
organization’s role and responsibilities.  
 
The Panel will also carefully scrutinize any aspect of the market that could inhibit the 
normal adjustments to supply and demand that one would expect to see in a competitive 
marketplace. For example, in order to ensure that transmission constraints do not create 
opportunities to take advantage of the market rules, the Panel has developed mechanisms 
that will be used by the IMO to mitigate the effects of local market power.  
 
The IMO’s Market Assessment Unit (MAU), which supports the MSP in these areas of 
responsibility, closely monitors market activity by tracking a set of market indicators, 
such as price, cost curves, outages and loads. Comparing this information against market 
models enhances understanding of the supply and demand factors underlying price 
movements in the marketplace and assists in the detection of flaws in the market design 
and potential cases of market abuse by participants. The Data Catalogue and Catalogue of 
Market Monitoring Indices are tools set out in the Market Rules to assist effective 
monitoring by the Market Surveillance Panel. The MSP and MAU safeguard confidential 
information carefully as set out in the Market Surveillance Confidentiality Policy. 
 
MSP members are appointed by, and accountable to, the Committee of Independent 
Directors of the IMO. They must not have any material interest in a market participant 
and cannot be directors, officers or employees of the IMO or of a market participant.  
 
Catalogue of Market Monitoring Indices 
 
1 Available Generation 
1.1 Total Capacity of Resources 
1.2 Total MW on Planned Outage by Resource Id 
1.3 Total MW on Forced Outage by Resource Id 
1.4 Total Available Ontario Generation on an Hourly Basis 
1.5 Market Participant Summary Outage Frequency 
1.6 Frequency of Resource Outages by Time Period, by Demand Conditions 
1.7 Comparison of Actual to Historical Outage Frequencies 
1.8 Correlation Between Outage Frequency and High Load Periods 
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1.9 Correlation between Available Ontario Generation to Market Clearing Price 
1.10 Comparison of Historical Water Transfers to Actual 
 
2 Ontario Electricity Market Volumes 
2.1 Total MW Offered on an Hourly Basis 
2.2 Total MW Bid on an Hourly Basis 
2.3 Total Dispatchable Load Bid 
2.4 Total Dispatchable Load Accepted 
2.5 Dispatchable Load Market Year over Year Average 
2.6 Total Hourly Injections Offered and Scheduled 
2.7 Total Hourly Off-takes Bid and Scheduled 
2.8 Import and Export Volume Change Year over Year 
 
3 Ontario Market Demand 
3.1 Hourly Load  
3.2 Comparison of Hourly Load to Pre-Dispatch Load 6 and 3 Hours Ahead of 
Each Hour 
 
4 Ontario Prices 
4.1 Market Clearing Prices and Intertie Zonal Prices for Energy and Operating 
Reserve 
4.2 Frequency of Maximum Market Clearing Price (MMCP) and Maximum 
Operating Reserve Price (MORP) 
4.3 Correlation between Price and Load 
4.4 Comparison between MCP and Pre-Dispatch Forecasted MCP 
4.5 Comparison between Hourly Ontario Energy Price (HOEP) and Pre-Dispatch 
Prices 6 and 3 Hours Ahead of Each Hour 
5 Ontario Nodal Prices 
5.1 Hourly Energy Nodal Prices 
5.2 Maximum Energy Nodal Price 
5.3 Price Ranking across Nodes 
 
6 Price Cost Margins 
6.1 Resource Specific Price-Cost Margins 
 
7 Comparative Prices and Loads for Surrounding Power Markets 
7.1 Hourly Prices for each System Day Ahead Market (DAM), Hour Ahead Markt 
(HAM) and Real Time 
7.2 Hourly Loads for each System 
7.3 Net Injections / Off-takes between Ontario and each System 
7.4 Comparison of Injections / Off-takes to Arbitrage Opportunities between 
Markets 
7.5 Comparison of Scheduled to Actual Transactions by Intertie Zone 
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7.6 Comparison of Scheduled to Actual Transactions by Market Participant 
7.7 Spot Market Energy Prices for Oil, Natural Gas and Coal 
7.8 Frequency and Volume of Intertie Transactions not Scheduled due to Net 
Intertie Ramp Limit 
 
8 Offers 
8.1 Resource Offer / Supply Curves 
8.2 Market Participant Aggregate Offer / Supply Curve 
8.3 System Aggregate / Supply Curve 
8.4 Resource Offer Curves by Fuel Type 
8.5 Comparisons of Resource Offer Curves to Historical Offer Curves 
8.6 Comparison of Market Participant Offer Curves to Historical Offer Curves 
8.7 Comparison of System Offer Curve to Historical Offer Curves 
 
9 Dispatch 
9.1 Identification of Resource Setting MCP and MORP 
9.2 Frequency of Individual Resources Setting Price 
9.3 Frequency of Resources Receiving Dispatch Instructions 
9.4 Deviations from Requested Dispatch by Resource Id 
9.5 Calculated Ramp Rates by Resource by Time Period 
9.6 Comparison of Actual versus Offered Ramp Rates 
9.7 Comparison of Offered Ramp Rates to Offered Automatic Generation Control 
(AGC) Ramp Rates 
9.8 Comparison of Offered Ramp Rates to Energy Ramp Rates 
 
10 System Operations 
10.1 Frequency of Administered Prices 
10.2 Frequency and Duration of Market Suspensions 
10.3 Comparison of Total Load (including Losses) in the Real-time Unconstrained 
vs Real-time Constrained Dispatch Solutions 
10.4 Frequency of Manual Intervention by IMO Operators in Issuing Dispatch 
Instructions 
(average MW, number of intervals per month) 
10.5 Frequency of Emergency Purchases 
10.6 Frequency of OR Reductions in Relation to Available OR 
 
11 Constrained On / Off 
11.1 Total Constrained On MW for Period 
11.2 Total Constrained On Payments for Period 
11.3 Frequency of a Resource being Constrained On 
11.4 Total Constrained Off MW for Period 
11.5 Total Constrained Off Payments for Period 
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11.6 Frequency of a Resource being Constrained Off 
11.7 Dispatchable Load Constrained Events Year over Year 
 
12 Transmission 
12.1 Intertie Capability Comparison Year over Year 
12.2 Congestion Management Settlement Credits Cost for Internal Transmission 
Constraints Year over Year 
12.3 Percentage of Time Interties are Limited Year over Year 
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Australia 
 
Market Overview 
The Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) was established in 1998 as a 
wholesale trading market across the interconnected electricity grid of South Australia, 
Victoria, New South Wales, Australian Capital Territory and Queensland. The market 
serves 7.7 million customers. 
 
Wholesale trading is through a compulsory pool for all significant generators (greater 
than 30 MW).  Simple bids are lodged on a day-ahead basis and quantity re-bidding is 
allowed up until dispatch.  Centralised dispatch is compulsory.  There are no capacity 
payments.  The wholesale market is operated by the National Electricity Market 
Management Company Limited (NEMMCO).   
 
Market Monitoring 
One of the distinctive features of the Australian regulatory model is that the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is both the national electricity regulator 
and the competition authority.  The primary responsibility for market monitoring and 
surveillance lies with the National Electricity Code Administrator (NECA).   
 
NEMMCO also has a role in the market monitoring process by being required to conduct 
reviews of significant operating incidents to assess the adequacy and response of facilities 
or services. These reviews must be made available to Code participants and the public. 
NEMMCO’s role also includes providing data to NECA. This includes  
 Re-bidding activity and reasons; 
 Dispatch compliance; 
 Routine reports and data requirements. 
 
NECA prepares weekly market analyses and quarterly statistical digests that monitor the 
performance of the market.  These reports include: 
 Monitoring and responding to potential Code breaches through continuous 
and targeted monitoring of market participants and systems 
o routine review of market operations using reports and data 
provided by NEMMCO;  
o random targeting of specific Code requirements  
o  monitoring and assessment of power traders and their ability to 
comply with the Code.  
o monitoring of variations between forecast and actual spot prices  
o determination of reasons for deviations 
o where breach of the Trade Practices Act (TPA) is possible, 
reporting to the Australian Competition and Consumer 
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Commission (ACCC).  This may lead to further action by the 
ACCC under the TPA. 
 Investigations 
o market events or practices 
o allegations made by other parties; and 
o referrals by the ACCC under a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) with NECA.  
 NECA will report incidents where it finds that significant variations are 
caused by activities that in its opinion are inconsistent with the objectives 
of the market. 
 
The Australian NEM is one of the few markets that follows a data release policy of full 
disclosure the next trading day of all bids, schedules and output levels. 
 
The weekly market analyses set out the spot price for each trading interval in each region 
and compare it with the average for the previous week and the last quarter. They highlight 
prices more than three times the weekly average. They also compare the demand and 
price forecasts published by NEMMCO four and twelve hours ahead of despatch with 
actual outcomes.  
 
The quarterly statistical digest brings together key information about the performance of 
the national electricity market. It includes: 
 
 market trends, incorporating time series information about spot price and 
demand. Different averaging methods are used to highlight trends in each region. 
Spot price occurrence and duration characteristics are both indicators of price 
volatility. Each region’s price is compared in these terms. Extreme high and low 
prices are also examined based on the maximum and minimum price for each 
region; 
 variations between forecast and actual prices, including explanations of all 
significant variations. There are many factors that influence these variations 
including changes to the demand forecast, system conditions and participants’ 
bidding behaviour. Differences in regional trends are presented in terms of time of 
day and hours to despatch. The analysis also assesses the accuracy of 
NEMMCO’s demand forecasts, which can impact on the extent of each variation; 
 rebidding. The amount and type of rebidding impacts on the effective  operation 
of the market. This section presents aggregated bidding and rebidding 
information. The type and extent of rebidding is a useful measure of the evolving 
trends and sophistication of participants’ bidding strategies; 
 reserve. The supply/demand balance can be reflected through the amount of spare 
capacity or reserve. Reserve varies by season and depending on available 
generation. The analysis also assesses the relationship between price and reserve 
at maximum daily demand; and 
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 ancillary services, including aggregate and time services information about the 
requirements and prices for these services. It also highlights changes in market 
share and rebidding. 
 
In addition to weekly analyses and quarterly digests, NECA also publishes reports of 
investigations into specific events in the market. There have been 15 published reports 
since April 1999. 
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 Singapore 
 
Market Overview 
 
As of year-end 2003, Singapore had a capacity of 8,919 MW.  In 2003 its annual 
electricity consumption was 32,000 GWh. Almost all of Singapore's electricity supply is 
from oil- and gas-fired power plants. 
 
In January 2003, Singapore’s New Electricity Market (NEM) was launched under the 
authority of the Electricity Act.  All of Singapore’s electricity is bought and sold through 
the Energy Market Company (EMC) in a half-hourly spot market.  The overall least cost 
dispatch schedule and market prices are determined each half hour by a computer model 
called the Market Clearing Engine (MCE). The MCE takes account of a full range of 
system constraints and generates locational marginal (nodal) prices for 33 injection nodes 
and 350 off-take nodes. Generators receive the relevant nodal spot price. Customers pay 
the Uniform Singapore Electricity Price (USEP). 
 
Market Monitoring 
 
The principal legislation governing the electricity market is the Singapore Electricity Act 
2001. This Act oversees the electricity licences, the Transmission Code, the Singapore 
Wholesale Market Rules and other codes, which all market participants, including the 
Energy Market Company, Power System Operator and the Market Support and Services 
Licensee (Power Supply Ltd) must comply with. 
 
The Energy Market Authority (EMA) is the regulator of the NEM and has the ultimate 
responsibility of ensuring that the NEM meets the needs of Singapore.  The Market 
Surveillance and Compliance Panel (MSCP) is an independent body established under the 
Singapore Electricity Market Rules and currently consists of five members. The Market 
Surveillance and Compliance Panel is responsible for the provision of a fair and 
competitive environment for all participants and can: 
• determine breaches of the Market Rules, 
• impose sanctions, 
• suggest rule modifications, 
• suspend, terminate or revoke the registration of market participants, 
• pass on its findings to Energy Market Company and Energy Market Authority, 
• publish its findings on Energy Market Company’s website. 
As an independent body, the panel ensures that monitoring, investigation and 
enforcement apply to all parties in the electricity market, including the Energy Market 
Company. 
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The Market Surveillance and Compliance Panel is supported in its functions by the 
EMC’s Market Assessment Unit.  This unit, under the supervision and direction of the 
MSCP, was directed by the Electricity Act to develop an information requirements 
system and evaluation criteria to enable effective monitoring of the market.  After going 
through a consultation process with industry participants it released in August 2003 a 
catalogue of data to be maintained by the MSCP. In July 2004 MSCP released a catalogue 
of monitoring indices to be used by the MSCP and the MAU to evaluate data collected.  
 
The market assessment unit is required to make a report, at least quarterly, on its day to 
day monitoring and evaluation activities to the market surveillance panel and the Chief 
Executive of the EMC. It is also required in the following cases to report: 
 To the market surveillance panel, where it discovers evidence of phenomena that 
may require investigation; and 
 To the Chief Executive of the EMC, where is discovers the possible need for a 
change to the market rules or evidence that a market participant may be breaching 
the market rules. 
Similarly, the market surveillance panel is required to make a report, at least annually, to 
the EMC board, giving an overview of its monitoring activities, a summary of all 
complaints, referrals and investigations, and any investigations it had conducted in 
respect of offer variations reported to it by the EMC. The annual report must also contain 
the market surveillance panel’s general assessment as to the state of competition in, and 
the efficiency of, the wholesale market. 
 
Catalogue of Data 
 
 Generation Registered Facility Characteristics 
 Maximum installed capacity of each generation registered facility 
(Confidential; Frequency: once and within 3 business days upon change) 
 Maximum generation capacity of each generation registered facility 
(Confidential; once and within 3 business days upon change) 
 Maximum ramp-up rate of each generation registered facility 
 Maximum ramp-down rate of each generation registered facility 
 Maximum reserve capacity (primary, secondary and contingency) of each 
generation registered facility 
 Maximum combined generation capacity and reserve capacity of each 
generation registered facility 
 Maximum regulation capacity of each generation registered facility 
 Maximum energy output at which AGC can operate for each generation 
registered facility 
 Minimum energy output at which AGC can operate for each generation 
registered facility  
 Fuel type of each generation registered facility; once and within 3 business 
days upon change 
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 Year the generation registered facility was first commissioned 
 Total annual forced outage hours (past three years) of each generation 
registered facility 
 Total annual planned outage hours (past three years) of each generation 
registered facility 
 Total annual overhaul hours (past three years) of each generation registered 
facility 
 Annual availability factor i.e. the percentage of time a generation registered 
facility is available to generate electricity in a year (past three years) of each 
generation registered facility 
 Transmission System Data 
 Maps and diagrams of the transmission system showing: ratings of 
transmission lines, import links from Malaysia, and location of each 
generation registered facility 
 Transmission line forced outage upon occurrence, by the next business day 
by fax 
 Proposed transmission line de-rating advice upon occurrence, by the next 
business day 
 Proposed transmission line maintenance outage programme daily, by the 
next business day 
 Supply Data 
 Occurrences of discretionary dispatch action taken by PSO (Upon 
occurrence, by the next business day) 
 Offers of energy, reserve and regulation submitted by all market participants 
(Daily, within 6 business days after the trading day Supply Data) 
 Offers exceeding offer change limits (offer variations and revisions to 
standing offers) (Daily, by the next business day EMC By CSV reports) 
 Scheduled dispatch quantity of energy, reserve and regulation by generation 
registered facility/market participant. (Daily, within 6 business days after the 
trading day) 
 Maximum target, minimum target and initial output of each scheduled 
generation registered facility. (Daily, within 6 business days after the trading 
day) 
 Metered generation quantity by generation registered facility/market 
participant (Daily, within 11 business days after the trading day EMC By 
CSV reports) 
 Annual overhaul duration of each generation registered facility in hours 
(Annually and upon change, within 3 business days after approval by PSO) 
 Total generation capacity under maintenance (planned outages and annual 
overhaul) (Daily, by the next business day) 
 Short-term planned outage by generation registered facility (Upon 
occurrence, by the next business day) 
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 Forced outage by generation registered facility (Upon occurrence, by the 
next business day) 
 Generation registered facility de-rating notification (Upon occurrence, by the 
next business day) 
 Security constraints (location, timing, volume, cause) (Upon occurrence, by 
the next business day) 
 Load shed forecast (Upon occurrence, by the next business day) 
 Load shed advisory notice (Upon occurrence, by the next business day By E-
mail) 
 Intertie submission information (Upon occurrence, by the next business day) 
 Availability factor (i.e. the percentage of time a generation registered facility 
is available to generate electricity) of each generation registered facility 
(Quarterly, within 6 business days after the end of quarter Generation 
Licensee) 
 Demand Data 
 Pre-dispatch load forecast (Daily, within 6 business days after the trading 
day) 
 Real-time load forecast (Daily, within 6 business days after the trading day) 
 Actual system demand (settlement ready metering data) (Daily, within 11 
business days after the trading day) 
 Historical system demand (past three years) (Once) 
 Pricing Data 
 Half hourly Market Energy Price ("MEP") at all market network nodes 
("MNN") (Daily, within 6 business days after the trading day) 
 Half hourly Uniform Singapore Energy Price (“USEP”) (Daily, within 6 
business days after the trading day) 
 Half hourly regulation price (Daily, within 6 business days after the trading 
day) 
 Half hourly reserve prices: primary, secondary and contingency (Daily, 
within 6 business days after the trading day) 
 Uplift charges (Daily, within 11 business days after the trading day) 
 Pre-dispatch schedules (Daily, within 6 business days after the trading day) 
 Real-time dispatch schedules (Daily, within 6 business days after the trading 
day)  
 Wholesale price (i.e. the approximate wholesale price that retailers pay for 
electricity) in $/MWh (Monthly within 6 business days after month end) 
 Other Data 
 Advisory notices reported by frequency, time, day and type Daily, within 6 
business days after the trading day 
 Information on issuance of notice of default and exercise of rights of credit 
support (Upon occurrence, by the next business day) 
 Information on total cost and providers of contracts of ancillary services 
(Within10 business days of entry into new contracts) 
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 Total turnover in the energy market in MWh and $ Monthly (within 11 
business days after month end) 
 
Catalogue of Monitoring Data 
 
 Supply Indices 
 Capacity ratio of a generation registered facility – Ratio of a generation 
registered facility’s (a) scheduled generation output to (b) maximum 
generation capacity 
 Supply cushion - Ratio of (a) the difference between total offered volume 
and system demand to (b) total offered volume 
 Outage frequency  
 Market share by (a) generation licensee and (b) generation registered facility 
 Comparison of metered generation quantity with scheduled dispatch quantity 
by generation registered facility/generation licensee 
 Frequency of issuance by PSO of dispatch instructions deviating from real-
time dispatch schedule  
 Frequency of offer variations or revisions to standing offers exceeding offer 
change limits 
 Demand Indices 
 Comparison of latest available very short-term load forecast with real-time 
load forecast and  
 Comparison of real-time load forecast with metered generation quantity 
 Price Indices 
 Trend of USEP, reserve prices, regulation price and comparison of trends 
 Percentage of hours and quantity of load when WEP1 falls into a particular 
price range 
 Correlation between WEP and system demand 
 Correlation between WEP and fuel price  
 Comparison of latest available short-term schedule projected prices with 
real-time prices 
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Nord Pool 
 
Market Overview 
 
The population of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark totals about 24 million. 
Electric power production in Norway is almost 100% hydropower. Sweden and Finland 
use hydropower, nuclear and fossil-fuel-powered generation plants. Over 90% of 
Denmark’s electricity comes from conventional thermal plants and combined heating and 
power (CHP) facilities.  
 
Nord Pool ASA - The Nordic Power Exchange - is the world's only multinational 
exchange for trading electric power and was established in 1993. It is owned by two 
national grid companies, Statnett SF in Norway (50%) and Affärsverket Svenska Kraftnät 
in Sweden (50%). 
 
Market Monitoring 
 
Originally most market monitoring was at the national regulatory authorities. However, at 
end of 2000, Nord Pool decided to strengthen the market surveillance it performs and 
established an independent market surveillance department responsible for monitoring the 
Nordic Power Exchange’s physical and financial markets.  The goals of this supervision 
includes ensuring that the market participants are acting according to the rules of the 
Exchange and that information disclosure is conducted in a correct manner. With respect 
to market power issues, the department does not publish a list of data and indices that it 
regularly tracks.  However, it does produce a 2-page report three times a year that 
contains some references to its activity in monitoring markets.  These reports make clear 
that the market monitoring process includes: tracking pricing trends within and between 
zones; monitoring capacity levels; conducting correlation analysis between zonal prices 
and transmission/generation outages/constraints.  However, there is no evidence that it is 
performing some of the more elaborate market monitoring procedures discussed 
elsewhere in this report.  
 92
